David Senra · JA + tiny EN

スタートアップ地獄の1000日を生き延びた——DoorDash トニー・シュー

Tony Xu of DoorDash: Surviving 1,000 Days of Startup Hell

英語はYouTube自動字幕ベース。日本語は学習用の整文対話。一次情報は動画。

センラシュー
FAQ 一覧 YouTube
センラ#1

まずはここから。君が「Palo Alto Delivery.com——DoorDashの前身——は、ミニマルなMVPの中でもいちばんミニマルだった」と言っていた。どう作った?

EN

So I want to start with the the fact that you said that Paulo Alto Delivery.com which was Door Dash and Ford Door Dash was the most minimal version of a minimal viable product. Can you explain how you built it?

シュー#2

アイデアを試すために、43分で何かを出せるなら、それはかなりいい。

EN

Well, whenever you can ship something in 43 minutes to test your idea,

センラ#3

たしかに。

EN

I think that's pretty good. And certainly this is, you know, 12 13 years before the rise of LLMs and AI tools to make it so easy to do that. But basically, the four of us wanted to test this idea that if you wanted to offer delivery from places that never offered delivery before, what is the fastest way to see whether or not consumers would care? I mean, at the end of the day, delivery is not a new idea. And so, we thought actually one of the reasons why maybe delivery in 2013 hadn't been around yet was just because nobody wanted it. So, we shipped powaltodely.com that alias was available for $9. And so, that's why we got it. not a super scalable URL, but we were able to get it. Um, it was a static page um where you saw eight PDF menus of restaurants that we frequented in Palo Alto. And the only way you can in which you can order is you can read through the menus. You can call a Google voice number that would ring the cell phones of the four founders and one of us would pick up. We would take your order, place the order on your behalf, go and get the order, deliver it to you. And I used to be an internet square and so I had these card readers which was one of their earliest products. These wide dongles that you could stick into the audio jacks of iPhones and that's how we would collect payment. Something I didn't remember until cuz it feels like Door Dash and and Uber Eats and everything else has been around forever but there wasn't what was the state of there was other delivery companies but you essentially created the market for this. Can you explain like when I was telling people I'm coming I'm really excited. I'm going to go speak Tony for Door Dash. They were like, I can't believe he survived in this like competitive market, but they just assumed that all like there was other apps out there that were already delivering for for restaurants that didn't have a delivery fleet that didn't exist then.

シュー#4

しかもこれは、LLMやAIツールで何でも簡単に作れるようになる12〜13年前の話だ。4人で検証したかったのは、「これまで配達を出していなかった店から届けられるようにしたら、消費者は気にするか」。いちばん速い検証方法は何か、だった。

配達そのものは新しいアイデアじゃない。2013年にまだ広がっていなかった理由は、単に誰も欲しがっていなかったからかもしれない、とも思った。だから powaltodelivery.com——当時9ドルで取れたエイリアス——を出した。スケーラブルなURLじゃないけど、取れた。静的ページで、パロアルトでよく行くレストランのPDFメニューが8枚。注文方法は、メニューを読んで、Google Voiceの番号に電話するだけ。4人の創業者の携帯が鳴って、誰かが出る。注文を聞いて、こちらで店に注文して、取りに行って、届ける。僕はかつて Square の初期プロダクト——iPhoneのオーディオジャックに刺す太いドングル型カードリーダー——を持っていて、それで決済を取っていた。

EN

No, actually, yeah. I I think one of the biggest misconceptions when we were founded was just how wide open the space was where there were about a million restaurants in the states and maybe 20 to 25,000 of them offered deliveries. Most of them were pizza shops, places in New York City, some in, you know, Chicago, some in, you know, big city centers. But outside of pizza places, maybe a few Chinese restaurants, nobody offered delivery. And so the real grand question or experiment of Door Dash, Palto Delivery.com was, okay, what about everyone else? What if you can enable everyone to actually offer delivery? What would that take? Um, and first of all, would people care? And that's really why we ship something so quickly, just to see if people would actually come and place orders.

センラ#5

DoorDash も Uber Eats も、今は永遠に存在していたように感じるけど、当時はそうじゃなかった。他の配達会社はあった。でも、配達フリートを持たないレストラン向けに配達する市場そのものを、実質的に作った。人に「トニー・シューに会いに行く」と言うと、「あんな競争の激しい市場を生き延びたのが信じられない」と言われる。でも相手は、すでにそういうアプリが山ほどあった前提で話している。当時はそうじゃなかったよね。

EN

So what were the existing companies doing then?

シュー#6

いちばん大きい誤解は、創業時にその空間がどれだけ開いていたか、だと思う。当時アメリカには約100万のレストランがあり、配達を出していたのは2万〜2万5000店くらい。ほとんどがピザ、ニューヨークやシカゴなど大都市の中心。ピザと一部の中華を除けば、ほぼ誰も配達していなかった。

DoorDash/Palo Alto Delivery.com の大きな実験は、「じゃあ残り全部は?」だった。全員が配達できるようにしたら何が要るか。まず、人は気にするか。だから超速で出した——注文が来るかを見るために。

EN

They were mostly um honestly faxing orders, believe it or not. So they would be a website that would receive orders, if you can believe it. They would fax the orders literally um into machines that would sit near the kitchen or the payment systems inside these restaurants. Then the restaurants would actually go out and do the deliveries themselves. So they were lead gen companies at the time. I've heard you talk about de developing this like last mile logistics network. Did you think about that back then or you were just like, "Hey, I'm just going to try to expand the market for food delivery."

センラ#7

既存の会社は当時、何をしていた?

EN

No, we did. So, the when we started um I guess to take a step back before we shipped Paltodely.com or even how we got there, you know, my co-founders and I really got connected because of an interest in small businesses. You know, I think my story I've told publicly, which is really I mean I grew up uh coming as to the States as an immigrant from China and my mom um you know, put food on the table by working three jobs a day for 12 years. One of those jobs happened to be at a Chinese restaurant where she was a waitress. I got to hang out with her, wash a few dishes when she allowed me to. That's kind of how I grew up while my dad was getting his PhD at the University of Illinois. That was, you know, the first 10 years or so of childhood growing up in the states. And that moment and experience always just gave me a deep appreciation for what small business owners represent. I mean that to them it there's no such thing as work. It it work life it's it's all the same thing. There's no concept of a weekend or a Saturday. It's Saturdays and Tuesdays are exactly the same days. And you just kind of get into this um process where that becomes your identity. And it's actually one of the most fascinating things I find about the great experiment that's America where you know because it becomes this all-consuming thing. One of the nice positive derivatives is actually they don't just create great experiences like a restaurant or a bar or a furniture store or a t-shirt shop. They actually create the GDP for all the cities that we live in. That GDP is what allows us to have great neighborhoods, schools, all the positive things that happen from a local community. And that was always my fascination with it. We had no idea though when we're looking at starting Door Dash about anything related to what these business owners problems were. And so my co-founders and I, we spoke with 300 maybe businesses up and down the Bay Area from San Jose to San Francisco, restaurants, retailers, service businesses, and it was actually a baker who showed us a booklet, a 3-in binder of delivery orders she had turned down. She was a oneperson shop who had no ability to fulfill or desire, frankly, to fulfill all those orders. And that was just a very strange moment for us where I said delivery is not a new idea. It's 2013. No one offers delivery. Why? And that's really what prompted us to think about, you know, launching Palo Alto Delivery.com to see if people cared. But to your question on logistics networks, you know, we said, okay, well, if the first place in which we can help local businesses is by building a logistics network, we have to pick a place to start. And and this is where I guess the math brain, you know, comes in for me where when we studied every category of local retail of where we would start, whether it was deliveries for restaurants, grocery stores, convenience stores, retail shops,

シュー#8

信じられないかもしれないが、ほとんどが注文をファックスしていた。Webで受けて、厨房やレジ近くのファックス機に流す。配達はレストラン自身がやる。リードジェンの会社だった。

EN

oh, those are all options.

センラ#9

ラストマイルの物流ネットワークを作る、という話も聞いている。当時からそこまで考えていた? それとも「フードデリバリーの市場を広げたい」くらいだった?

EN

We looked at all of them. And we had this hypothesis that if you wanted a chance of creating a logistics network that could actually be successful that can be very fast that can you know be very flexible meaning it can you know deliver in 30 minutes or it can deliver you know uh longer than that. Um you needed network density. You needed um the most number of connections between consumers and stores. We kind of targeted restaurants because there were a million restaurants. You know, if you compare that to the number of grocery stores, there was maybe a couple hundred thousand grocery stores. Um, and you looked at other categories of retail, restaurants had the highest count of stores. And so very quickly um you know we made the assumption that if there's any vertical to get started in doing deliveries it would be restaurants and prepared meals to give us a chance to build to build the highest density network so that one day we can deliver everything else. I want to tell you about the presenting sponsor of this podcast ramp. I have been reading a lot about SpaceX lately. SpaceX is one of the most valuable private businesses in the world and there's an idea from their history that more companies should use. From the very beginning, SpaceX was constantly attacking and questioning their costs. RAMP helps many of the most innovative businesses in the world do exactly that. The median company running on RAMP cuts their expenses by 5%. And the important idea that I found by reading about SpaceX is that a religious dedication to controlling costs helps increase revenue because you can pursue opportunities you couldn't otherwise. We see that in the RAMP data, too. The median company running on RAMP also grows their revenue by 16%. So, when you're running your business on RAMP and your competitors are not, you have a massive competitive advantage that compounds over time. Ramp is the only platform designed to make your finance team faster and happier. Many of the top founders and CEOs that I know run their business on ramp. I run my business on ramp and you should too. Go to ramp.com today to learn how they can help your business save time, save money, and grow revenue. That is ramp.com. There was other people that had maybe a similar idea, but I heard you tell the story one time where you're like, well, they actually went into like city centers

シュー#10

考えていた。一歩引くと、Palo Alto Delivery.com を出す前から、共同創業者たちと繋がった理由は中小企業への関心だった。僕の話は公にしているけど、中国から移民として来て、母は12年間、1日3つの仕事で食卓を支えた。その一つが中華レストランのウェイトレスで、許されるときだけ一緒に皿を洗った。父がイリノイ大学で博士を取るあいだ、米国での子どもの頃の最初の10年くらいがそうだった。

その経験から、中小オーナーへの深い敬意がある。彼らに「仕事」と「生活」の分離はない。週末の概念もない。土曜も火曜も同じ。それがアイデンティティになる。アメリカという実験の面白い点の一つで、全部を飲み込むからこそ、レストランやバーや家具店だけでなく、街のGDPを生む。そのGDPが近所・学校・コミュニティの良いものを支える。ずっとそこに惹かれていた。

ただ DoorDash を始める時点では、オーナーの課題が何かは全然わからなかった。だから共同創業者と、サンノゼからサンフランシスコまでベイエリアの店・小売・サービス業、約300社と話した。あるパン屋が、断った配達注文を綴じた3インチのバインダーを見せてくれた。一人店で、全部をさばく能力も、正直なところ意欲もなかった。2013年なのに配達がない。なぜ? それが Palo Alto Delivery.com を出して「人は気にするか」を見るきっかけになった。

物流ネットワークで地元ビジネスを助けるなら、どこから始めるかを選ばなければいけない。ここで数学脳が出てくる。レストラン、グロサリー、コンビニ、小売——各カテゴリを全部見た。

EN

and one advantage you I I don't even think this might have been an accidental you started in Palo Alto instead of like New York City. Can you talk about why that was important?

センラ#11

全部オプションだったわけだ。

EN

Yeah. Well, starting in Palo Alto was um I mean not a conscious choice. I it was just where we were students at the time. But one of the earliest experiments we ran at Door Dash was doing deliveries in Palo Alto versus doing deliveries in San Francisco. So a city center if you will. That was close to where we started the company. And one of the fascinating things we found out um and we didn't understand why initially was we were actually completing deliveries faster um inside Palo Alto than we were inside San Francisco. Obviously San Francisco is a more dense place. But one of the things we learned early on though was that obviously, you know, in Palo Alto, you had much easier parking. You had a lot um fewer apartment complexes where you had to go up and down the stairs and figure out where the lobby was or the right elevator entrance, things like that. Palo Alto had the following which is if you looked at places like Palo Alto it's really um it you know represents I think most cities in the US or a lot of the world where you have main streets and then you kind of have you know in the spokes um outside of this main street hub of commerce you have where the people live and if you actually thought intelligently about what that really told you you can actually build a very efficient logistics system if you just you know understood how to you know manipulate some of these hubs and spokes. And so this was one of the earliest you know hypotheses we had that you can actually make a logistics business as efficient you know in a place like a Palo Alto versus San Francisco that was you know guided by that experiment. But the second thing was actually just in talking to customers. What customers told us was they said, "Look, in San Francisco, I can just walk down, you know, the the the the elevator from and head out the lobby and we could probably find a few places to go and eat." In Palo Alto, you'd be walking for miles before you could achieve something like that. You know, the closest, you know, set of restaurants near Stanford University where we started this was 2 miles away on University Avenue, as an example. And that's true in a lot of places um in in America. And so if there was any place we thought where there would be the highest um interest from consumers and a possibility where you can actually make the math work, it was places like Palo Alto. And the question, you know, to us was just how many of them are there

シュー#12

全部見た。成功する物流ネットワーク——速く、柔軟で、30分でもそれ以上でも——を作るにはネットワーク密度が要る。消費者と店舗の接続が最大になる場所。レストランは約100万店。グロサリーは数十万。小売の他カテゴリより店舗数が多い。だから垂直の最初はレストランと調理済みの食事にして、密度の高いネットワークを作り、いつか何でも届ける、という仮説をすぐ置いた。

EN

and the only people doing deliveries at this time are the four founders.

センラ#13

似たアイデアを持つ人もいたが、彼らは都市中心に行った、と聞いた。君たちがパロアルトから始めたのは偶然に近いメリットだったのでは? なぜ重要だった?

EN

Yeah. In the in the very beginning, it was just it was just the four founders.

シュー#14

意識的な選択というより、当時学生としてそこにいたから。でも初期の実験の一つが、パロアルト配達 vs サンフランシスコ(都心)配達だった。最初わからなかったが、パロアルトの方が完了が速かった。SFの方が密度は高いのに。

理由はすぐに見えた。パロアルトは駐車が楽で、ロビーやエレベーターを探すアパートが少ない。メインストリートと、そこからスポーク状に広がる居住地——アメリカの多くの街、世界の多くの場所と同じ構造。ハブとスポークをうまく扱えば、効率的な物流ができる。SFより効率を出せる、という初期仮説をその実験が導いた。

もう一つは顧客の声。SFではエレベーターで降りてロビーを出れば、近くに食事がある。パロアルトではマイル単位で歩く。スタンフォード近辺だと、University Avenue のレストラン群まで約2マイル。アメリカの多くの場所がそうだ。消費の関心が高く、数学が合いやすいのはパロアルトのような場所だと感じた。問題は、それがいくつあるか、だけだった。

EN

Okay. So you had a line about this where it said it became obvious that the need was higher outside of the cities. We did not have the data to prove it at the time. We had the conviction that because we were doing the deliveries ourselves that this could be true.

センラ#15

当時配達していたのは創業者4人だけ。

EN

Yeah. I mean we saw I mean when one of the um benefits when you do the deliveries is well one you see how hard it is to actually you know bring you a burrito on time every time correctly. Um, and the second thing is you get to see who the customer is. And you saw the customer actually almost always was a mom, you know, who had young children, who had not a lot of time, who didn't want to cook, you know, every single meal, who wanted just looked for any solution to save her time. And so when we did those deliveries, we just saw, wow, well, there are a lot of young families out there, and let's go find out where they hang out. Let's go find out where they live. And that's why we had that sense that you know we can build a business you know with this audience to start.

シュー#16

最初は4人だけだった。

EN

Is that another unexpected benefit of starting in these basically the suburbs or the cities? Think about like the typical city populations like maybe more single people or maybe like just a couple but it's not large families shoved in these buildings.

センラ#17

「都市の外の方がニーズが高いと明らかになった。当時データはなかったが、自分たちで配達していたから確信があった」——そういうラインがあった。

EN

Yeah. I mean, I I I think that was probably a derivative of the discovery, but no, I think in the beginning, especially when you're looking for product market fit as an entrepreneur, you're looking for

シュー#18

配達のメリットの一つは、毎回正しく・時間どおりにブリトーを届けるのがどれだけ大変かがわかること。もう一つは、顧客が誰かが見えること。ほとんどが若い子どものいる母親で、時間がない、毎食作りたくない、時間を節約できる解を探している。だから若い家族が多くいる、と感じて、彼らがどこに住み、どこで集まるかを探し始めた。そのオーディエンスで事業を作れる、という感覚があった。

EN

someone who actually just wants your product organically. And we could tell very quickly that someone who has young children who maybe doesn't want to take a stroller, pack it up, pack all the things that come with the stroller, then, you know, put that, you know, stroller and the children into the vehicle, then get it out and then somehow get into inside of a crowded parking lot or a restaurant. Well, there are a lot of those people. And if we can solve it for that group, then we believe we could build a business that can easily grow organically. You're right. I mean, there's a second derivative, which is there more mouths to feed when you have a family than when you have, you know, one or two people living inside of a city. But that wasn't the first thought we had.

センラ#19

郊外スタートの副次効果でもある? 都市は単身やカップルが多く、大家族がぎゅうぎゅうの建物に押し込まれていない、という話。

EN

But even more than a second derivative, because you were just explaining like, okay, well, if I'm delivering to somebody's house, I know where the park where to park as opposed if I'm in a city, you have to navigate where's the lobby, how do I get in this building, what floor do I get, how to access the elevator, right?

シュー#20

発見の派生物ではあるが、最初に探していたのはプロダクトマーケットフィットとして、オーガニックに欲しい人がいるかだった。ベビーカーを畳んで車に積んで、混んだ駐車場や店に入る——それを避けたい人はたくさんいる。その層を解けば、オーガニックに伸びる事業になる、と信じた。家族の方が「口」が多い、というのは第二の派生物で、最初の思考ではなかった。

EN

Yeah, totally. And the the presence of single family homes made it a lot easier for sure. Um that was one of the benefits of delivering to places like Palo Alto. But again I think it just came from this very simple experiment which had an anomalous finding which is why is it faster to deliver in Palo Alto than it is in San Francisco? Why is it faster to to deliver in a less dense place in in other words? Exactly. This is what is interesting to me. It almost made it sense like your competitors seem to do the the most obvious or like the the logical thing. It's like no I need order density. Where are all the people? let me just go to the cities. We chased where the I think when you're starting out the number one thing every entrepreneur is looking for is do you have something that someone else wants and is it real? Meaning like it's not artificially inflated with discounts and marketing dollars and you know just other ways to inorganically grow. Um will people actually use it? Will they actually tell their friends about it if they actually like the service? And that's what we found early on with places like Palo Alto. Even when you were called Palo Alto delivered

センラ#21

それ以上に、家への配達なら駐車場所がわかる。都市だとロビー、階、エレベーターのアクセスを毎回ナビしなきゃいけない。

EN

especially when we were called money right yeah we had no exactly we were we were we ran this out of my bank account and that's why I knew early on even though look we didn't have any models or you know unit economic forecast or anything like this but even though I was running out of my bank account where I also had student debt at the time my bank account wasn't going down you know every single week or every single month so something was telling me that maybe this is a chance of working.

シュー#22

完全に。一戸建てが多いと楽だった。でも出発点はシンプルな実験と、変則的な発見——なぜ密度の低いパロアルトの方が速いのか——だ。競合はいちばん論理的に見えることをした。「オーダー密度が要る。人がいる都市へ」。僕らは、誰かが本当に欲しいものがあるか、ディスカウントやマーケで水増しされていないか、を探していた。使い、友人に話すか。パロアルト——Palo Alto Delivery と呼ばれていた頃から——でそれが見えた。

EN

What were your costs at the time? Cuz you have the four founders lab essentially labor. You probably not paying yourself. Exactly. You're not paying yourself free labor, right? Just your time. You built a $9 website. Yeah.

センラ#23

当時は自分の銀行口座から回していた、とも。

EN

I heard something that was hilarious. We were like, well, we we don't have a sophisticated dispatch system, so we just use the Find My Friends app.

シュー#24

まさに。学生ローンもある口座から回していて、モデルもユニットエコノミクスの予測もなかった。でも週ごと・月ごとに口座が減っていなかった。何かが「これはうまくいくかもしれない」と教えてくれた。

EN

We used Find My Friends. We used Find My Friends. We used

センラ#25

コストは? 4人の労働で、自分には払っていない。無料労働。9ドルのサイト。

EN

to track the drivers, which just happened to be all of you,

シュー#26

その通り。自分には払っていない。

EN

our co-founders.

センラ#27

高度なディスパッチがなくて、Find My Friends アプリでドライバーを追跡していた、という笑える話も聞いた。ドライバー=自分たち全員。

EN

You have a Google voice number.

シュー#28

Find My Friends を使っていた。創業者同士を追跡していた。

EN

You're not There's no marketing advertising, right?

センラ#29

Google Voice。マーケも広告もなし。

EN

No. No. No, we had no money to market or advertise.

シュー#30

ない。広告する金がなかった。

EN

So, what are you what other expenses did you have back then? Do you remember?

センラ#31

じゃあ他の経費は?

EN

It was all kind of like self-unded. This entire uh you know activity was selfunded until we had to start recruiting drivers and actually you know testing this out beyond just the four of us.

シュー#32

ほぼ全部セルフファンデッド。4人を超えてドライバーを集め、スケールを試し始めるまでそうだった。

EN

This is when you applied to Y Combinator or No.

センラ#33

それが Y Combinator に応募した頃?

EN

Yeah. Yeah. I mean in that time period.

シュー#34

その時期だ。

EN

Okay. By the time you apply to Y Cominator, do you have more than drivers than just the founders or No,

センラ#35

YC応募時点で、創業者以外のドライバーはいた?

EN

we may have had one or two.

シュー#36

1〜2人いたかもしれない。

EN

Okay.

センラ#37

授業もあるから、交代で配達。学生と配達の両立は厳しい。

EN

Yeah. Very quickly we realized, well, we're we're in class and so, you know, we took turns doing deliveries while we were in class, but at some point it's tough to, you know, be a student and do the deliveries.

シュー#38

すぐそう感じた。授業中に交代で配達していたが、限界がある。

EN

How many years did you have left of business school? Like, how many years were you in school and running?

センラ#39

ビジネススクールはあと何年? 学業と並行はどれくらい?

EN

We had maybe 6 months left before graduation. I mean, we were effectively Stanford's delivery service, you know, for the second half of or for the first half of 2013. We were effectively Stanford's delivery service. Then we then we um um get Door Dash um the URL and and and the company name and then we launch out of Y Cominator in the summer June 20.

シュー#40

卒業まで約6ヶ月。2013年前半は実質スタンフォードの配達サービスだった。そのあと DoorDash のURLと社名を取り、YCから6月20日頃ローンチした。

EN

So was it like now once somebody starts using Door Dash or when I start using Door Dash, right? I'm like, "Oh, this is very convenient." I just keep using it over and over again, did you see that same behavior pattern back then?

センラ#41

今の DoorDash ユーザーのように、便利だと何度も使う行動は、当時から見えた?

EN

Yeah, with a very small group of users because in the beginning we actually did not have high volume. I mean it was probably 10 orders a day, something like that. and maybe our high day was like 21 orders a day, something like this. Most of them uh however were done by a small group of users at Stanford. When you see that fact that the same customers are ordering over and again uh even though it wasn't growing like wildfire um but our bank account also wasn't getting depleted um it gave us enough conviction to keep going. What were the conversations amongst the founders when you guys are saying that let's keep going and let's I think we viewed it as a project more than we viewed it as a company. In fact, we were barely incorporated. We were not incorporated when we were running this um at Stanford University and then we you know just got incorporated when we actually um got into YC. But at the time it was just like let's just see what the next phase should be. I think sometimes when you start these projects, you absolutely should have a point of view on maybe where this can go in terms of going the distance, but the most important thing is to just get started and then to have a sense of what the next two or three steps are. No one is able to, you know, know everything about the future. And for us, the summer was really instructive. I mean, the summer, I think doing the deliveries ourselves for the first six months gave us the clarity that the summer was really about answering three questions. what consumers want to pay us six bucks, which is what we charged. Um, are there restaurants who would be willing to partner with us for 15%. And, you know, could we afford a wage that we could pay dashers, the drivers, for the service? That was it. That was the entirety of the YC summer. It was not about demo day or, you know, raising the most amount of money or becoming the most popular, you know, at some event. Um, it was just answering those three questions. And if we had enough conviction answering those questions, then we'd keep going. Again,

シュー#42

ごく小さなユーザー群で見えた。最初は高ボリュームではない。1日10オーダーくらい、ピークでも21くらい。大半はスタンフォードの同じ顧客のリピート。爆発的成長ではなかったが、口座も枯れていない。同じ人が何度も頼む——それで続ける確信がついた。

EN

you told this hilarious story um where, you know, during the summer, some of your classmates are like, "Yeah, I'm going to go, you know, ski in or something like that. What are you doing, Tony? Like, I'm delivering hummus in my Honda."

センラ#43

創業者同士の会話は?「続けよう」と。

EN

Yes. Yes. That was uh Yeah. Look, I mean, I think we had a lot of classmates at Stanford who looked at us and just thought, "Boy, like I thought they were like, you know, smart, but you know, I I guess they want to spend their time doing this." Um, and so look, in the beginning of a lot of these entrepreneurial ventures, nothing looks that amazing, right? We were working out of an apartment. We had dashers in that apartment. We had the co-founders live in that apartment. We worked 10:00 a.m. to 2 a.m. every single day, but it wasn't like this glamorous exercise. And but nor did we seek that, you know, we were just trying to answer those three questions that summer. We didn't care that much about what our friends were doing. Clearly, we thought that um it was um interesting enough to keep going that if we can actually answer these questions, I think we're actually on to something.

シュー#44

当時は会社というよりプロジェクトだった。スタンフォードで回しているときはほぼ未法人化で、YC入ってから法人化した。次のフェーズは何かを見よう、という感覚。距離の先まで全部わかる必要はなく、始めることと、次の2〜3ステップの感覚が大事だ。

その夏は特に教示的だった。最初の6ヶ月自分たちで配達して明確になったのは、夏に答えるべき3つの問いだった。(1)消費者は6ドルの手数料を払うか。(2)レストランは15%で提携するか。(3)ダッシャーに払える賃金を成立させられるか。それが YC の夏の全部だった。Demo Day でいちばん金を集めることでも、イベントで人気になることでもない。3問に十分な確信が持てたら続ける。

EN

We just had uh Mark Andre on the show and he's got this great line where he says, "I firmly believe that people that do great things are doing them for the first time."

センラ#45

夏に同級生がスキーに行く中、「トニーは何してる?」「ホンダでフムス運んでる」という話、笑える。

EN

Huh. Did anybody have any restaurant or or actually not even restaurant experience because you're not even in the restaurant, any delivery? Any of the founders have anything to do with logistics or delivery, anything?

シュー#46

あった。スタンフォードの同級生の多くは「頭いいと思ったのに、こんなことに時間を使うのか」と感じたと思う。起業の最初は華やかじゃない。アパートで働き、ダッシャーも創業者も同じアパート。毎日午前10時から深夜2時。華やかさを求めてもいなかった。3問に答えたかっただけ。友人が何をしてるかはあまり気にしなかった。答えられれば、何かがある、と思っていた。

EN

No. No. It's actually why we had to do the deliveries. I mean I mean the reason why we did so the reason why we were so hellbent on doing the deliveries besides the fact that we had no idea whether we had any business recruiting other drivers was how does this work? How should it work? I think Door Dash early on even to this day but early on was so hard to explain because it was actually even to build the MVP yes to test it was just this website you know palmut.com but we had to build like four things. We had to build this website for consumers. We had to build some app for the restaurants actually receive the orders. We had to build an app for the drivers, the dashers. And then we had to build a dispatch system, you know, that actually could oversee all of the operations. So even in the very beginning, we realized, wow, this is actually pretty interesting. It's just such a fun problem that you in order to actually just bring you a burrito, you have to build these four things. And then to do it really, really well, I mean, that's why we did all the deliveries to figure out how you actually do that. So, you were misunderstood back then. You just said something interesting. You think that's still the case to this day?

センラ#47

マーク・アンドリーセンが番組で言っていた。「偉大なことをやる人は、それを初めてやっている」と。創業者の誰か、レストランや物流や配達の経験はあった?

EN

Absolutely. Because I think most people, and I totally get it. I mean, think of Door Dash as a consumer app. You know, most people think of us as lunch and dinner. And I think what they don't see is everything behind the scenes. I think a lot of times I think you can look at, you know, products like ours, especially as a consumer, and you say, "Wow, this looks like any other product. You know, there are so many of them." But then I would ask the question, well, how come one just gets used more often than the next or the others? And it comes down to everything that you can't see. You know, one of the things we say a lot internally at the company at Door Dash is it's always the data that you can't see that kills you. Because if you can see a truck coming at you, you're just going to dodge and get out the way, but if you can't see it, you're dead. And it's no different with our business. Our business is one where all of the magic or the secret sauce, if you will, are in things that you cannot see. You know, no consumer is sitting there while they're ordering Door Dash thinking about what the Dasher experience should look like or what the operations should be to get the best quality experience at the most affordable price or what are the ways in which you take out every single friction and cost with a restaurant or a retailer and make sure that all the items are actually there even when they're not there. You know, I think all of these things are the things that make Door Dash special and make Door Dash an end-to-end experience that's very difficult to replicate. But yeah, I think early on we knew that because we we did all the deliveries. You know who knows it? Your competitors. So, you're not going to like this cuz you're in my opinion really humble, probably too humble uh for my liking. Uh but people in your industry are afraid of you. And uh one I I have to tell you a personal story that I don't even think you know. And um I didn't know I I've heard about you before. I didn't really, you know, obviously use Door Dash, but I never thought about it. Exact. What you just described is exactly my experience. I was just like, I have a magic button that brings me a burrito.

シュー#48

ない。だから配達した。他のドライバーを雇う事業があるかもわからない中で、どう動くか、どう動くべきかを知るために、配達にこだわった。MVPのサイト自体は paloaltodelivery だが、実際には4つ作る必要があった。消費者向けサイト、レストランが注文を受けるもの、ダッシャー用アプリ、全体を見るディスパッチ。ブリトーを届けるだけなのに4つ。うまくやるには配達を全部やって理解するしかなかった。

EN

Exactly.

センラ#49

当時は誤解されていた。今もそうだと思う?

EN

Okay. I love that magic button. Don't take that magic button away from me, whatever you do. But I was in Stockholm about a year and a half ago

シュー#50

絶対に。多くの人は DoorDash をランチとディナーのコンシューマーアプリだと思う。裏側は見えない。似たプロダクトがたくさんあるように見えるのに、なぜ一つが使われるか——見えないところにある。社内でよく言うのは、「見えないデータがあなたを殺す」。トラックが見えれば避ける。見えなければ死ぬ。ビジネスも同じ。魔法やソースは見えないところにある。注文中にダッシャー体験やオペ、レストランの摩擦削減や在庫の正確さを考えている消費者はいない。それがエンドツーエンドを複製しにくくしている。初期に配達したから、それがわかった。

EN

and uh Daniel was very kind to host uh me and like a handful of European founders. And one of the European founders that was sitting next to me and Daniel at dinner was somebody I had never met before and it's Mickey from Vault.

センラ#51

謙遜しすぎだと思うが、業界の人は君を恐れている。個人的な話がある。ストックホルムで、ダニエル(エク)がヨーロッパの創業者数人と夕食を開いてくれた。隣に座ったのが、初めて会うWolt のミッキーだった。ヨーロッパの DoorDash を作った人、と紹介される感じだった。自分は誰の下でも働かないと思っていた、と。ヘッド・トゥ・ヘッドの戦いの中、記憶が正しければ追加で約10億ドルのタームシートが目の前にあった。サインしようとして、口が勝手に「勝てない。彼には勝てない」と言った。信じられない、と。金を燃やして戦うか、人生を変える額で売ってトニーの下で学び直すか。今も直属で、ヨーロッパ全体を見ている、と。

EN

Okay.

シュー#52

彼がヨーロッパ事業を回している。

EN

Right. Cool.

センラ#53

ダニエルと彼が説明していたのも、「見えない魔法」がいかに戦いづらいか、だった。別の引用も読みたい。「DoorDash の成功は、何万もの実験の積み重ねで、その95%は顧客に届く前に失敗する。配達の精度を上げるには、想像より低い・深いディテールが要る」——どういう意味?

EN

But he told me something interesting because you know basically the story was he's just like listen I built the Door Dash of Europe I guess is how was described.

シュー#54

これも、自分たちで仕事をしたところから始まる。時間どおりに届けたいとき、外から頭だけで考えると「渋滞があるかも」「調理が遅いのかも」くらいで終わる。実際に現場に出るまで、注文の遅延がどこから来るのか、本当のソースはわからない。外から想像できる問題もあるが、すぐ気づくのは、あらゆる動きに秒単位の遅延があることだ。配達は約20ステップに分解できる。各ステップに遅延がある。しかも今日の配達はレストランだけじゃない。グロサリー、小売、複数階のモール——地下も地上もある——だと、さらに複雑になる。

遅延の原因は想像以上に多い。初めて遭遇するまで知らないものがほとんどだ。DoorDash の難しさの核心は、カオスな物理世界の中に構造化データセットを作ろうとしていることだ。ミス・遅延・コストが顧客体験の良し悪しに落ちる理由の多くは、Google のような誰かがきれいに整理したデータセットが存在しないからだ。全部が物理情報で、しかも常に変わる。スーパーで誰かがリンゴを通路6から8に移しても、文書化されるとは限らない。もちろんされない。そういうことに毎日取り組む。

「遅延の原因は、その日ホームシックだった人だ」と言われたら、その出来事が起きるまでどうやって知る? 起きたらどう応える? 毎日数百万オーダーなら、100万に1回のイベントも毎日起きるし、1000に1回はそれ以上に起きる。検出して予防するシステムと、崩れたときに直す緊急応答のような高速の筋肉の両方が要る。仕事を繰り返し、時間とともに良くなる学習システムを組む。

多くの場合、最初はわからない。実験から始める。だから実験の大半は失敗する。でも何万の実験から5%でも効けば、その年のオーディエンス全員に翌年まで効く。そこからまた続ける。すべてのオーディエンスに複利の余剰が積み上がる。

EN

And uh he's like I always thought of myself as an entrepreneur. I never thought I would work for anybody. And he's just like we were in a head-to-head battle right and he's like I had a term sheet in front of me if I remember the number correctly. He was getting like a bill. He had the ability to raise another fresh billion dollars of capital.

センラ#55

その実験の量は、年単位? DoorDash の歴史全体? 毎年何千も回している?

EN

Yeah.

シュー#56

理想的には、そう。ベストの状態ではそれが起きている。出発点は「学びたい」と欲するシステムを作ることだ。なぜ学ばなければいけないか。物理世界は(A)構造化されていない、(B)どこにもドキュメントがない、スクレイプできない、(C)常に変わる。例えば今、北東部に冬の嵐がある。毎日違うことが起きる。

EN

And he was looking at the term sheet thinking about signing it. And then he said involuntarily something came out of his mouth. And he says, I can't beat He's like, I can't beat him. And he's like, I cannot believe that came out of my mouth. And he's like, and then he looked down. He's like, I could either light this money on fire or I could sell my company for life-changing money and go work for Tony and learn a lot. And I think to this day, he still directly reports to you. Correct. Yeah,

センラ#57

カリフォルニアはきれいだね。

EN

he runs all of our European business

シュー#58

そう。ベイエリアにいるとわからない。甘やかされている。でも一般に、毎時間何かが起きている。今日どこかで欠品がある。どこかで異常に長い注文がある。アパートの門を間違える。オフィスビルの階段でダッシャーが迷う。保証されている。 全部を人力で把握しようとするのは無理だ。学ぶシステムを作れなければ。

DoorDash でいちばん大事なのは、システムを作ることだ。そのシステムは、運用的でハックな「スケールしないこと」から始まり、効いたアイデアをプロダクトにし、本当に効いたものをエンジニアリングして、学習ループをできるだけ効率的にする。エンジニアの数も、出荷できるものの量も制約で、しかもステークが高い。ループをタイトに、速くする。そうやって何千のことを学び、何度も繰り返す。

僕らの事業は、翌日またあなたにサーブする権利を稼がなければいけない、と思っている。今日注文してくれてありがとう。でも明日、スコアボードはゼロに戻る。また全部やり直す。

EN

and he was trying to explain to me and Daniel about just you don't it's all the magic is very similar what the stuff that you don't see how hard he is to to compete against. You had some another interesting quote I want to read to you. You say the way that Door Dash has achieved so much success is tens of thousands of experience 95% of which never even make it to the customer before they fail. The way to get a more to get more accurate on a delivery probably requires some level of detail that is lower and deeper than you realize. Can you explain what you meant behind that statement?

センラ#59

その「毎日ゼロから」の重要性はどこで学んだ?

EN

This again starts from actually doing the work ourselves and realizing that if you actually want to get something on time, um I think it's very easy to think about uh when you're just intellectualizing it, you know, on the outside when we're getting started. Oh, maybe there's a traffic issue or maybe oh the food is taking longer than it than it should. Whatever the reasons might be, but you actually have no idea actually what are all the sources of delay in an order until you actually go and do the work. Sure, there might be some of the issues that I I think you can think about on the outside, but then very very quickly you realize that there's a lot of seconds of delay in every emotion. In fact, there's about 20 steps you can decompose a delivery into. And there's delays at each one of those moments. And that's, you know, even more complicated if, you know, the delivery today is uh they happen outside of restaurants, they happen inside shopping contexts like groceries or retail items or if they happen inside malls that are multi-story, sometimes below ground, sometimes above ground. And one of the things you start realizing is, wow, actually there are a lot of causes for delays. And there's no way that you're going to know about all of them until you literally actually encounter it for the first time. A lot of what's difficult about Door Dash is we're trying to build a structured data set in a world that is chaos. That's the physical world. The one of the reasons why there's all these sources for mistakes, for delays, for costs that ultimately, you know, yield into costs and good or bad um you know, experiences for customers is because there is no data that exists. There is no nice data set that a company like a Google or somebody else has organized for you. Um because it's all physical information and it's also changing all the time. When you go into a grocery store and somebody moves an apple from aisle 6 to aisle 8, is that always going to get documented? Of course not. Uh those are the kinds of things we have to work on every single day. And and and you wouldn't know that. You know what? If I told you the the cause for a delay was because actually somebody was homesick that day. How would you know that actually, you know, until that event actually transpired? And what would you do to respond, you know, to that event if that were to occur, which happens every single day, you know, when we're doing millions of orders every single day. the one in a million event happens a lot and the one in a thousand event happens way more than that. And so building a system that can ideally detect and prevent these issues, but then also a very fast twitch muscle to actually be able to build this I mean almost like an emergency response system when something actually goes ary to fix it. That requires doing the work over and again and building the system that can learn over time to get better and better and better. Most of the time we have no idea. We start with the these experiments and that's why most experiments fail. But when you get enough goodness out of it, if you can get the 5% out of tens of thousands of experiments to work, you know, in one year, that has the benefit on all of your audience for the next year. And then you just keep going and that adds compounding surplus for all of the audiences. Deal will help your business hire, pay and manage any worker anywhere in the world. Deal is the best company in the world at building infrastructure for global hiring. Deal is one platform for payroll, HR, benefits, and device management across 150 countries. Deal gets you everything you need to run a high-erforming global workforce on a single AI native platform. From first offer to final offboarding, deal handles the complexity so you can stay focused on your business. The best founders and operators in the world have one thing in common. They control as much of their business as possible. And the founders of Deal do exactly this. When you use Deal, you aren't using a third-party payroll processor or a messy network of incountry providers. Deal built and owns the rails. That means faster speed, better service, and total accountability. The founder of 11 Labs, who I use to make transcripts for this podcast, has a great description of the value that deal can give your company. He said, "We built 11 Labs to break down language and communication barriers. With deal enabling us to hire and support exceptional talent anywhere, we can accelerate our innovation and bring more voices, stories, and ideas to every corner of the world. Deal is trusted by over 40,000 customers and growing fast. Learn how they can help your business by going to deal.com/enra." That is deal.com/enra. How do you do that many experiments though and on a like is this a yearly basis? Is this like over the history of Door Dash? Like you're running thousands of experiments every year

シュー#60

何の?

EN

ideally. Yeah. Yes. I I think when we are at our best that's that's that's what's happening. But but but it starts with actually building a system that actually wants to learn. If you think about like like why do we have to learn? It's because the physical world a is not structured. It's not documented anywhere. It's you you can't scrape it. Um it's constantly changing. It's I mean there's a winter storm right now, for example, in the Northeast. I mean, these are all things that happen differently. You know,

センラ#61

毎日やり直す、というアイデア。前にも言っていて好きだ。

EN

it's beautiful here in California.

シュー#62

DoorDash のごく初期。信頼を保つのがどれだけ難しく、失うのがどれだけ簡単か。スタンフォードのフットボール試合の日、ドライバー不足で全配達が遅延し、しかもサイトを止められなかった。

EN

Yeah, I know. We would have no idea here. We're spoiled here in the Bay Area. But like, but in general, all these things are happening every single, you know, hour of the day. Okay. There's going to be some missing item today. There's going to be some order that took a lot longer today. There's going to be some incorrect gate we entered at an apartment complex. there's going to be some dasher who's going to get lost coming up the stairs of this office building. There will be guaranteed. And so the question is like well it would be impossible to try to you know figure out all of that if you can't build a system to learn how to do this. So the most important thing is actually building systems and building a system that you know at Door Dash really starts with testing things in a very operational hacky do things that don't scale kind of way into then taking the things that ultimately work the ideas and actually building products around them and then engineering the ones that actually work so that you're actually very efficient with this learning loop so that you can go from learning to shipping something that actually works. Because you know it's a resource constraint with you know how many engineers we have and how many things that we can actually ship especially when the stakes are high and you want to make that loop as tight and as fast as possible. That's how you build a system in which you can learn thousands of things and you just have to keep doing it over and over. You know our business is one where we believe we have to earn you know the right to serve you the next day. Even though you ordered with us today, thank you very much for your business. We have to earn it again. you know, the scoreboard goes back down to zero tomorrow and we have to just do that all over again.

センラ#63

歴史上どこ?

EN

Where did you learn the importance of that?

シュー#64

稼働3ヶ月目、2013年9月の土曜。注文をさばけず、サイトも止められず、洪水を止められなかった。

EN

Of what?

センラ#65

3ヶ月で洪水になる理由は?

EN

Of starting over again every day. I've heard you say that before and I love that idea.

シュー#66

その日だけ。試合終了のタイミングで、パロアルトで夕食を頼む人が一気に増えた。

EN

Very early at Door Dash. Um, we learned um how how hard it is to keep someone's trust and how easy it is to lose it. And you know, I I I think I may have said this before, but there was um there was a Stanford football game in which we lost um a lot of trust where we were late on every single delivery because we didn't have enough drivers on the road. We had no ability to shut down the website, but we had a lot of those

シュー#67

ボリュームが跳ね、止められず、さばけず、全配達が最低1時間遅れ。一度きりじゃない。今も毎日カスタマーサポートをしていて、毎日見る。1オーダーで信頼を失えるとわかると、翌日また稼がなきゃいけない。セット・アンド・フォーゲットはない。初期の体験と、毎日のサポートが強化している。

EN

This is the third month of our operations, September of 2013, where it was a Saturday. We had no ability to fulfill the orders that came in. We had no ability to even shut down the website. So, we couldn't even like stop the floodgates. And usually,

センラ#68

試合の夜、そのあと何をした?

EN

why were you having floodgates 3 months in?

シュー#69

全配達が遅れた。夜10時頃、返金でどれだけコストがかかるかを集計していた。

EN

We had floodgates not 3 months in on that day specifically, for whatever reason, because of when the game ended, people wanted to order Door Dash for dinner in Palo Alto.

センラ#70

顧客が返金を求めた?

EN

And for whatever reason, um you know, that volume spiked pretty hard. We had no ability to turn it off and no ability to to fulfill. So, we were late by at least an hour on every single delivery. I think when you go through experiences like that, but not just once, but we've had a lot of those kinds of experiences at Door Dash. I mean, you know, I still do customer support every day. I see them literally every single day. When you see that you can lose someone's trust um on one order, you realize that you got to earn it again the next day. And there is no such thing as this, you know, just set it and forget it kind of mentality. Yeah, that came a lot from the early days. But I think this daily reminder when I do customer support is also another great reinforcing function.

シュー#71

誰も何も求めていなかった。夜が終わり、最後の配達を終えて、「最悪の夜だった。どうする?」と。15秒くらいで、顧客に対して正す、全員返金、と決めた。問題は当時金がなかったこと。初期はずっと資金調達が苦しく、あと2〜3週間分のキャッシュしかなく、返金はその口座の約40%だった。誰も求めていなかったが、すぐ返金した。その夜クッキーを焼いて、顧客が起きる前の朝5時頃に届けた。凡庸で生きるより、自分が立てたい基準で死にかけながらやる方がいい、という判断だった。

EN

So what happened that night of the game?

センラ#72

素晴らしい。自己強化する学習システムをどう作ったか、もう少し。

EN

We were late on every single delivery. Um, and I think it was probably somewhere around 1000 p.m. or something where we're tallying up all the refunds that it would, you know, cost us if uh we wanted to make right and kind of give back everybody their money.

シュー#73

こういうものは段階で起きる。4人で配達している。続けられるが、いつかスケールの壁に当たる。4人でできる配達には限界がある。だからダッシャーを集め、消費者を集め、レストランを売る。配達をしながら、(1)自分をスケールするプロダクトが要る、(2)問題が見える、と気づく。同じ問題が2回以上繰り返されたら、「これは何か作る/実験する候補だ」と言う。当時は組織も厳格なシステムもなく、アパートの数人だった。でも最初の1年に、「スケールしないこと→仮説→実験→プロダクト出荷」という考え方の芽があった。

1年ほど経って複数都市に出ると、ボストンを回す人、ダラスを回す人、別の都市のGMが僕にレポートする。都市A・B・Cにパターンが見える一方、ローカル差もある。ボストンは車保有が米国でも低い。歴史的な街の作りが、ハブ&スポークの前提を崩すこともある。では、「スケールしないことから、効くとわかった機能を出荷する」やり方を、どう各GMに教え、同時に実験を増やすか。共通パターンには横断プロダクトを作る。

年月をかけて形が変わってきたが、基本は科学的プロセスから始まり、どこかでそのプロセス自体をスケールする次のイテレーションが要り、それを繰り返す。常に顧客にとって良くなっているかでテストする。それがノーススターだ。

EN

Were the customers asking for the refunds or no one was asking? No one was asking for anything. We were the the night was over. We finished our last delivery and we said, "Okay, that was a terrible night. what are we going to do about it? We could complain about, you know, the orders or or something, but at the end of the day, I I think within a very short period of time, 15 seconds, we decided, okay, we got to make right by the customer. So, we got to refund everybody. Now, the complication is we had no money at the time. I was having a hard time raising I mean, this is a pattern for me. I've had a hard time raising capital for the company in the earliest years. Uh, and that started right from the beginning. I mean like we were maybe two or 3 weeks of cash out and this refund would have cost us about 40% of the bank account. So it would have just made the two or three weeks and just shrunk that into even fewer days. But yeah, you're right. Nobody asked us for the refunds. I'm sure they were pissed, but nobody asked. We did we did the refund right away and then we stayed up that night actually baking cookies and we delivered those cookies at around 5:00 a.m. U before we thought when customers would awake. And the idea was we'd rather die trying to be excellent or at least die trying to do the thing that we want to stand for than to live to be mediocre and not something that we'd be proud of. And that's what we did.

センラ#74

速さ、安さ、効率——何がノーススター?

EN

That's excellent. So tell me more about building the system, this self-reinforcing like learning system.

シュー#75

全部。このビジネスは一次元で評価されない。最大のセレクション、最低価格、最速配達、ミスなし、時間どおり、問題が起きたら正しく扱われる——毎オーダーで全部を見られる。

EN

Look, these things kind of happen um in in in steps, right? So it started with the four of us doing the deliveries and Okay. Well, we can keep doing the deliveries. Um, but at some point we're going to start um running into scale issues. I mean, four people can only do so many deliveries. So, of course, we're going to start recruiting dashers. We're going to start recruit um recruiting consumers um selling restaurants. Um and you start noticing uh a as you do the deliveries, well, you have to build products to scale yourself. That's one. Two, you also just start noticing all the problems. And when you whenever you see a problem recur more than once, you would say to yourself, "Aha, maybe that's, you know, an example of a problem that we should actually build something for or actually run an experiment to see if we could actually solve." So I think very early on um the bias for action turned into this experimentation mentality. Now, we didn't have like any organizations at the time or anything like that. It was just like a few of us in my apartments. It wasn't like, "Okay, there's this like rigorous system that I'm talking about." That's probably the earliest inklings though of how we thought about okay, you can go from doing things that don't scale to identifying hypotheses to test to then running experiments and then to shipping products. That was probably the earliest like time, the first year of the company. You fast forward maybe a year as we started launching into multiple cities, all of the general managers of different cities. So you could be running Boston, someone else is running Dallas, someone else is running, you know, a different city. Uh they would be reporting into me. Um and you start seeing that oh okay well patterns actually emerge you know from city A to city B to city C but they are still quite local um there's slightly you you know for example in Boston there's not a lot of cars um car ownership is one of the lowest in Boston you know in the United States versus other places there's there's some strange setups because of the historic nature of the city in terms of that hub and spoke nature I was describing that that actually violate that that that setup. So there there are like local nuances and you start realizing well okay well how do I actually you know teach this way of doing things that don't scale all the way to shipping you know some feature that we know is going to work to each one of these people so that we could run more experiments at the same time and then we would just build more products that would actually um you know go across all of these different patterns. So that's kind of how this thing you know has morphed over the years where you basically start with some basic scientific you know process if you will. You meet some point in which you have to figure out the next iteration in order to scale that process and then you just keep that going and you're always testing you know against whether or not you're delivering better for customers. That's always going to be the northstar metric of whether or not this process is actually making a difference or not. Is it better for customers if it's faster, cheaper, more efficient? Like what are the

センラ#76

「変わらないもの」の上に事業を作る、という話につながる。顧客視点で DoorDash の変わらないものは?

EN

Yeah, it's all of the above. So, look, customers, I mean, this business is tough because customers unfortunately don't just judge us on one dimension. Some customers, all customers want the widest available selection. They want every item they can get, you know, delivered. They want the lowest possible price. They want the fastest possible delivery. They want obviously no mistakes. They absolutely, you know, expect it to be on time. And then if something were to go wrong, of course they deserve to be treated correctly. We get judged on all of those things on every single order.

シュー#77

セレクションはもっと欲しい、価格はもっと安く、配達はもっと速く——Amazon とほぼ鏡だ。

EN

So this is this idea of like you can build a business around things that don't change.

センラ#78

人は何を望むか、自分でその役を演じればわかる、という話でもある。

EN

Yes.

シュー#79

簡単だと思う。旅行の方向を声に出して問う。所得が上がる世界で、人は便利をもっと求めるか、少なく求めるか。消費に回るか。常識の答えが出て、その上に事業を建てられる。

EN

What are the things that don't change from the customer's perspective for Door Dash? Then

センラ#80

朝食でも話していた。人間性で変わらない柱——もっと便利が欲しい。

EN

customers are always going to want more and more selection. They're going to always want more and more affordability. They're going to want faster deliveries. is like Amazon almost the exact like mirror of what Amazon

シュー#81

いつも。ロケット科学ではない。ロケット科学は、どう実現するかだ。

EN

well I think when you when you just think about what people want I I I actually think it's pretty easy because we can play that role ourselves and yeah I I I I think you just ask the you can ask very basic questions about what's the direction of travel of certain things like for example like do you think people are going to expect more convenience or less convenience especially in a world where you think that people are earning more um you know whether today versus the past tomorrow versus today. What do you think they're going to do with those dollars? Is it going to go more towards consumption? Are they going to expect or demand more convenience or less? I think when you start asking questions just out loud, you you get the common sense answers in which you can build a business around.

センラ#82

複雑さを隠す、という考え方。ベゾスと何時間も話したことがある。Founders で15本くらいやっている。家の前にギロチンを置かれた話をすると、「世界中の欲しいものがボタン一つで届く魔法を作った。全部の金を持っていてほしい」と言ったら大笑いしていた。君も毎日カスタマーサポートをしている。メール? チャット? 電話?

EN

We were talking about this with the crew at breakfast. It's just like, well, their cornerstone of their business is some a trait in human nature that's never going to change, which is like we want more convenience.

シュー#83

全部。毎日。

EN

Yeah. Always. I I I it's not um it's not rocket science. I think the rocket science is actually how do you make it happen?

センラ#84

なぜやる?

EN

Yeah. I love this idea of like you're hiding the complexity. I I spent several hours with Basos uh oneonone and u I'm obviously a massive fan of his. I've done like 15 episodes on him and he had he listens to my other podcast and I told him I was like, "Dude, you know how crazy it is that they put a guillotine in front of your house in Washington?" And I go, "You made a magic button I can press that that anything I want in the world shows up to my house in two days and now it's like a few hours and all I do is press the button and you handle all the other complexity behind it." I was like, "You deserve all the money. I hope you have all the money." He just laughed and laughed and laughed. You said something. You're doing customer support every day. Is this customer support? Emails. What is this? Emails or chats? Sometimes phone calls every day?

シュー#85

理由はいくつかある。さっき話した通り、DoorDash のような会社の魔法——そして難しさ——は、見えないところにある。だからまず、あらゆるところに観測可能性を作る。ダッシュボード、システム、そしてますますAIツールもある。でも同時に、消費者・加盟店・ダッシャー・広告主が書いてくれるインバウンドも見える。無視できる。でもそれはただの無料情報だ。こんなプロダクトを持てて、どれだけ幸運か。メールはだいたいポジティブじゃない。でも、体験が壊れたと教えてくれるほど気にしてくれている。事業の最大の殺し屋はだいたい沈黙だ。彼らは気にして知らせてくれる。僕には、返事だけでなく、最終的にその問題を解く責任がある——礼儀というより義務だ。

第二に、会社の残りにもそれをやらせたい。会社が少し大きくなり、少し成功すると、顧客や「やるべき仕事」とのあいだに障害が増える。会社になると、スポットライトが当たるのは売上・利益などの財務指標ばかりになる。上場企業がレポートする数字の中に、顧客が知っている・気にしているものは、たぶんほぼない。それがずっと気になる。強い財務は、顧客をサーブできた結果として出るはずなのに。だから、自分が個人でやることを含め、繰り返し・強化する仕組みをたくさん作り、この会社のナンバーワンの仕事——唯一の宗教——は顧客の問題を解くことだ、と常に認識できるようにしたい。

EN

Yeah. Say more about this.

センラ#86

データとエピソードが矛盾したら?

EN

Well, why do you do this? You know, I I was saying earlier that for a few reasons. You know, one of the things that we're talking about earlier is that so much of the magic or the difficulty of building a company like Door Dash is in all the things you can't see. And so, the first thing you got to do is you got to build observability everywhere. you know, of course there's observability with dashboards and systems and um you know, increasingly, you know, AI tools, but but also I can see the inbound, you know, of of customers who write us, whether it's a consumer, a merchant, a dasher, an advertiser, and I can choose to ignore them, but those are freebies. I mean like how lucky am I to actually have a product in which people care enough you know even I mean usually usually they're not very positive emails but I mean like but they care enough to actually let me know you know I think the greatest killer of a business is usually silence and and here they're actually they care enough to actually let me know something went wrong in their experience. I owe them, you know, uh certainly not just a response, but actually I think the and not the courtesy, but I owe them the responsibility of actually solving that problem ultimately. And so, first, it's an obligation to the the customers. Second, it's actually something that I want the rest of the company to do. You know, I think one of the easiest things as companies get a little bit bigger, perhaps earn a little bit more success is there more obstacles between them and the uh the the customers or the jobs to be done. You know, for example, when you become a company, you know, all of a sudden there are the only things that kind of get spotlighted are the financial metrics, your revenue, your profits. Um none of which are metrics that customers care about. that there are no metrics in in what we report uh you know to to as a public company that customers know about probably or care about frankly and that always is quite bothersome to me because it's because of our ability to serve customers that can hopefully achieve you know strong financial metrics that uh investors care about and so a lot of what I'm trying to do is building as many reinforcing and repetitive mechanisms and motions, including things that I do individually, that will allow this company to always recognize that the number one job and the only religion at this company is to solve problems for customers.

シュー#87

難しい。顧客の言うことにはだいたい真実の要素があり、チーム間のトレードオフになる。データ側に寄りやすいのは、気づかれる問題や「エッジケース」が分布のテールにあるからだ。サポート待ち時間、対応の親切さ、遅延・正確性、レタスというSKU単位の在庫——全部テール。優先順位の議論ではデータが勝ちやすい。

でもプロダクトを良くするのは、定義上ほぼエッジの改善だ。だからパワーユーザー——トップダッシャー、最多注文の消費者、長く付き合っている加盟店——と、新規ユーザーに時間を使う。どちらも結果分布の端。13年一度も触っていない新規は、初めての注文の難しさを教えてくれる。パワーユーザーは現実世界のカオスにいちばん多くショットオンゴールがある。エッジの逸話はデータと食い違いやすく、プロダクト改善の価値がいちばん高い。

EN

What do you do when the data and the anecdotes conflict?

センラ#88

毎日のサポートでエッジを見つけたら、次の一手は?

EN

It's a tough one. Um, I think that um, usually there's always an element of truth in what customers are saying and and it usually becomes a trade-off, you know, discussion. uh you know for for different teams. The the reason why it's a tough decision is because it is so easy to always just veer on the side of the data because almost always when a customer notices something that is wrong um or or there's an anecdote um uh that may be a quote unquote edge case. It's usually at some tail of a distribution. Um, a distribution of the wait times for customer support, a distribution of how friendly we were when we actually took the call, a distribution of how on time we were or how late we were or how accurate we were, or what are the number of items of the types of SKUs you care about in a particular category of lettuce. Just lettuce, not vegetables, but just lettuce, right? So, it's always some tail example. And so the data is probably always going to win when it comes to a some sort of a prioritization discussion. But when you actually think about how to make a product better, it's going to almost always by definition be in improving the edges, you know, and that's why a lot of times what I like to do personally is I love to spend time um uh you know, with a lot of our power users, whether it's, you know, the the top dashers or um uh the consumers who order the most often or the merchants who we've been doing um you know, business with for a very long period of time and also the new users. They're at the tales of the distribution of almost every outcome. A new user, you know, who's never touched Door Dash before and, you know, for the 13 years that we've been around will absolutely, you know, tell us about how easy or difficult it is to place their first order in a way that, you know, someone who's been used to all the things that, you know, we've been training together with customers on have figured out. a power user also, you know, you know, sees all the issues too because they have the most shots on goal for some chaotic event to happen in the real world that we couldn't capture. And so those edges of the distribution are almost always where the anecdotes are that are the most valuable um that you have to pay the most attention to because they almost always will disagree with the data and they are probably worth the most in terms of improving your product. So let's say you find one of these edge cases as you're doing customer support every day. What's your next step?

シュー#89

いちばん好きなのは長いもの。創業者研究と同じで、長いほど分布が読める。短い既知の苦情より、ダッシャーからの2000語メール——物流アルゴリズムが壊れたケースがたくさん——はデバッグになる。物理世界、システムの壊れ、物理とシステムの接点の失敗。デバッグツールでステップを全部追う。

EN

So the ones I love the most are actually um the really long ones actually the ones where there's a lot of gold. It's probably like you know uh the research you do on founders which is the longer almost the better because you get to study the distributions. When it's a short you know email about something you already know about there's not as much you know perhaps interesting material in it. What you know I love the 2,000word emails especially from dashers who will give many use cases of why the logistics algorithm broke for them and it becomes almost like a debugging exercise right of both physical world things that have occurred things about our systems that you know probably broke um and things in our products that couldn't interface well enough between the physical world and our systems and so then I go into our debugging tools and I actually literally track the And every single step I'm watching and

センラ#90

自分で?

EN

personally, you're doing this personally.

シュー#91

自分で。エラー源の仮説が出たら、ダッシャーや消費者に電話やメールして、改善のナゲットがあるかを確かめる。逸話にスポットライトを当ててプロダクトを良くできるか——それが狙う機会だ。

EN

Yeah. Yeah. And and you know, once I start figuring uh out potentially where, you know, the sources of error are, you know, I'll either generate the hypothesis and call the dasher or email the dasher, you know, depending on the best way to reach them or or the consumer. Um, and then actually find out whether or not there's a nugget of insight there of something we actually could improve. So put a different way, can we put a spotlight on an anecdote that improves the product? That's the opportunity I'm looking for.

センラ#92

永遠のミッション、とも言っていた。DoorDash の永遠のミッションは?

EN

I've heard you describe this as like this inter eternal mission, right? How would you describe what the eternal mission of Door Dash is?

シュー#93

地元経済を育て、力を与えること。何度も言う。永遠なのは、永遠に戦う価値があるからだ。街のGDP・幸福・安全を伸ばす最善は、その街の小・中・大ビジネスを成功させること。雇用と消費の大半、警察・消防・公園・学校・病院の財源を生む。

どう成功させるか。物理世界は常に変わり、スクレイプしにくい——だからこのミッションは実りやすい。データは変わり、整理されておらず、テキストと一人の関係だけじゃない。DoorDash の1オーダーには少なくとも消費者・ダッシャー・加盟店の3人がいる。複雑な注文ならもっと。彼らにとってそれはアイデンティティであり生計だ。オフィスのバイトではない。そういう人に勝ってほしい。分布のエッジを永遠に探し、プロダクトを良くし、彼らが成功すれば街と近所は持続可能で活気づく。

EN

Yeah. Well, the eternal mission of Door Dash is to grow and empower local economies. We say this a lot. And the reason why it's eternal is because I think it's a it it's a fight worth fighting for or a cause worth fighting for forever, which is the best way to grow the GDP or the happiness or the safety um of a city is by making the small, medium, and large businesses in that city successful. they produce the vast majority of jobs and you know consumption dollars for the economy and the the monies for the police department, the fire department, the parks, the schools etc. the hospitals. So the question is like well how do you actually make them successful? One of the most positive tailwinds of why this could be a very fruitful eternal mission is because the physical world is always changing, right? And and and it's hard to just scrape it. Um and it's one of the things I love the most about it. It's hard to just, you know, scrape all that information, say job is finished, and then put it through some LLM or something. The Well, A, that data is always changing. B, it it's not organized as all at all. And C, it's not just an it's not like some relationship between a text, you know, editor and a person. I mean, there's a lot of people. There's there are three people involved on every single order at Door Dash. at least there is a consumer, there's a dasher, there's a merchant, at least three people. Um, now given that we do more complicated things, there's even more sometimes. And you know, for those people, this is this could be their identity. Back to, you know, what I was saying about small business owners and how they believe that what they do, it's not a office job or something, you know, that they just use to earn money so that they could spend consumption dollars or something else. This is like their livelihood. This is like who they are. When I think about those kinds of people, I want those people to win. And so if we have to eternally always look for the edges of the distribution to keep improving the product, of course we will. And if we can do that and we can make them successful, then they're going to make many things, you know, about the cities and the neighborhoods that we live in continue to be sustainable and very, very thriving.

センラ#94

代替案は恐ろしい。巨大プレイヤーが1〜2社だけ。

EN

And the alternative is terrifying. You have one or two big players.

シュー#95

考えたくない。買う経路が1〜2、場所が1〜2のロボットのような世界。街のGDPは伸びず、近所のアイデンティティも削られる。人が好きな近所には人格があり、その多くはビジネスが与える。家以外で友人と集まる場所。街が「最高」と感じる理由だ。永遠に戦う価値がある。

EN

Yeah. I don't even want to think about the alternative. You're totally right. I mean the alternative is it's a very robotic world where maybe we buy things in one or two ways or from one or two places. That's not a world in which you're going to grow, you know, the GDP of these cities. And actually, that's a world in which you may take away some of the identity, I would argue, of some of the neighborhoods. I think one of the reasons why people love neighborhoods or that there's certain neighborhoods that they, you know, maybe preference is because there's a personality to it. So much of the personality is given by who the businesses are and therefore you and your friends want to go frequent and go hang out in those places in addition to, you know, your homes and things like that. And that's what makes it tick. That's what makes a place feel awesome. Um, a city feel awesome. And so I think that's an eternal mission worth fighting for.

センラ#96

1年や5年、10年で終わる話じゃない。集めたデータはどう使う?

EN

Yeah. Cuz this is not something that you can accomplish in a year, 5 years, 10 years. It's constantly changing. What do you do with all this data that you're collecting? Well, I mean the first is we have to structure it. So um you know one of the things that I think um Google uh you know so brilliantly did was they did organize a lot of the information on the internet and they made it searchable you know to everybody. Right now the first thing we're doing is we're still collecting lots of information and then right now we're trying to do two things with it. You know, the first thing is we're certainly trying to grow a merchants's business by allowing you to search for their stuff through our app and you know, we'll bring them incremental business that way. The other way is we're actually trying to make it useful for them. So, we're giving data back to them telling them when

シュー#97

まず構造化する。Google がネット上の情報を整理して検索可能にしたように。いまは情報を集めつつ、2つやっている。アプリで検索できるようにして加盟店にインクリメンタルな売上を運ぶ。もう一つは、加盟店自身にデータを返す。

EN

data about their own business.

センラ#98

自社ビジネスのデータ。

EN

Yeah. like when you're out of stock of certain items or that did you know that you know you are underpriced in this particular you know menu item versus what you know what you could be pricing at or that there's an opportunity to bundle certain um uh or or to create certain you know SKs or new uh um items on your on on your menu or in your catalog if you're a retailer that we think would grow your actual business.

シュー#99

欠品のタイミング、メニューのこの品が他と比べて安すぎる/高くできる、バンドルや新SKUの機会——小売ならカタログ上の新商品——など。

EN

This is like Bezos has that line about Amazon Prime. He's like, "We want to make it so valuable. It's irresponsible if you're not a member." Like, it's just insane. So, if you can have data for small businesses, medium businesses, big, even large businesses that they didn't know, like that pricing thing is interesting to me where it's like, well, you're charging, you know, $15 for this plate of chicken where we see all these other I assume you're getting the data from all the other merchants on your platform where it's like you could be people are willing to pay $25 for that thing. Essentially, it' be irresponsible not to partner with you if you have all those insights. We can also take the same approach that we've built for ourselves, you know, the scientific process from doing things that don't scale to shipping things at scale on your behalf. Like you as a merchant can be running experiments too. Now maybe you can't because you're a single person. You're single. You're literally one person like the baker that I was telling you about that inspired a lot of our discovery of delivery who doesn't have all the capabilities to run all these. But why can't we do those things for you? Why can't we for instance what do you mean do them for me?

センラ#100

ベゾスの Amazon Prime の言葉——「入らないのが無責任なくらい価値がある」。同じ洞察を中小から大企業まで持たせたら、提携しない方が無責任になる。価格も、他加盟店のデータから「チキンが15ドルだけど人は25ドルまで払う」が見える。自分たちがスケールしないことからスケールへ持っていった科学的プロセスを、加盟店の代わりにも回せる?

EN

We could talk about simple things to more difficult things. the simple things. We could, you know, change menu prices on your behalf. We can buy different kind of promotions for you based on what return thresholds you want to achieve. We can talk about more complicated things. You know, for example, you know, there's there are certain merchants who want to actually grow um tremendously. They why not, right? They don't just they want their identity their I mean their passion project to be exposed to as many people as possible. Some of those businesses, for example, um find it very hard though to grow, you know, from one store to two stores to then somehow 2,000 stores. But imagine if you baked cookies, as an example, and you wanted everyone to have your cookies. Why can't we match your products with businesses that don't sell your product and actually create a supply chain in which you can actually, you know, sell those products in more places and you can literally make everyone win. You know, the the the new business who's selling your product now has a new menu item called a cookie. You get to maximally, you know, increase your um your exposure. There's a range of things in which we can do with the information. um and make it productive if we knew what your goals were. And so a lot of what we're doing with a lot of businesses is at scale, how do we maximally increase, you know, your exposure, your identity and achieve whatever goal you may have.

シュー#101

単純から難しいことまで。価格変更、目標リターンに合わせたプロモの買い方。もっと複雑には、1店から2店、2000店へ伸ばしたい人。クッキーを焼いて全員に届けたいなら、その商品を扱っていない店とマッチし、サプライチェーンを作り、双方が勝つ——新店にはクッキーというメニュー項目、作り手には露出。ゴールがわかれば、情報を生産的に使える。スケールで、露出とアイデンティティとゴール達成を最大化する。

EN

So that's with restaurants. Tell me some of the

センラ#102

レストランだけでなく小売も。

EN

or retailers.

シュー#103

あらゆる物理ビジネスに広げると面白い。レストランも小売も、僕と同じ起業家だ。アイデアや情熱を世に出したい。Tシャツを作って売りたいなら、DoorDash のオーディエンス、倉庫・物流・在庫、何万もの近所・都市でのテストで、店を開く前に検証できるはずだ。未来の創造のビジネスパートナーになれる理由がない。

EN

Yeah. Like this gets really interesting when you expand out to every physical business. When I think about restaurant tours, retailers, to me, they are they're no different from me in the sense that they're are entrepreneurs. They want to create something. They want something that they have, an idea they may have, um a passion they may have, and they want it to be exposed into the world. That gives them fulfillment of a variety of sort of ways. Okay. So, let's say that you want to um make t-shirts and sell t-shirts. That's a passion um project of yours. There should be no reason why you can't do that today from you know testing that idea with the audiences that we have with the warehousing and logistics inventory that we have with the ability very quickly to test in any neighborhood any city in the tens of thousands of you know different neighborhoods that we serve or cities that we serve and operate in and see whether or not you may have something before you actually go out and try to spend a lot of money to open up a store or something like that there's no reason why we can't be your business partner for any future creation.

センラ#104

頭がおかしくなる。DoorDash=食事を取る手段、としか思っていなかった。

EN

Dude, this is blowing my mind because I just think about Door Dash as a way to get food.

シュー#105

どこから始めて、どう続けるか、だ。こうしたアイデアの多くは顧客から来た。サポートをする理由の一つは、自分が大量に学ぶこと。分布のエッジを学ぶ。

EN

Yeah, I love the idea behind this.

センラ#106

顧客から来た例は?

EN

It's all about where you start and how you keep going, right? And by the way, a lot of these ideas um came to us from our customers. You know, back to your question about why do I do customer support? I learn a ton too. Yeah, of course. I learn about all the edges of the distribution.

シュー#107

2014年、忘れない。カリフォルニア州最大級の農場を3世代で回す農家。毎日何百台ものトラックで州を上下し、青果や肉をグロサリー・レストラン・ホテルに配っていた。農場を始めたのはトラックを運転するためじゃない。創業2年目に書き込みがあり、電話で話した——その問題を解けないか、と。

EN

What are some examples of things that customers have? Okay. So, one customer in 2014, I'll never forget, was a farmer um who runs one of the largest farms in the state of California. And they run hundreds of trucks every day up and down the state of California. Okay? Distributing their produce and their uh meats and other products to a variety of grocerers, restaurants, hotels, etc. and they they've been doing this for three generations as a family. They did not start their farm to drive a bunch of trucks. That is not the business that they aspired to be in or passionate about. And literally um in our second year of operation, they called me or they wrote in actually and then we had a conversation on the phone about um what they were interested in. They were in they were curious whether we could solve that problem for them.

センラ#108

2年目にそれを聞かれた。

EN

That's wild. They even asked you that. and and this was the second year of the business and and so you know I I I I said not yet at the time you know perhaps I should you know I I almost feel like I owe him a call so this conversation is a good reminder but the the when I I I think you've earned you know our goal over time is to be the first phone call for any business um that any business for any issue yes today the number one calls we get about are about delivery totally get it totally understood Increasingly, they've been about other things. Can you actually help us build our app? Can you help us acquire customers? Can you help us analyze customers, retain customers, customer support customers? Can you help us store inventory? So, those questions are more and more coming inbound and that's why we've shipped a lot of the products that we have at Door Dash. Um, but I think if done right, Door Dash can be your first phone call to start any business. I mean that that's really what we wanted and and and we can do it in a way that is very low cost that you know doesn't have to scale if you don't want it to. You know some people are very happy with one or two locations or if you want to become the next McDonald's or you want to become the next Walmart. One of my all-time favorite quotes is from the book 0ero to1. It says the single most powerful pattern I have noticed is that successful people find value in unexpected places and they do this by thinking about business from first principles instead of formulas. This is exactly what Apploven has done with their new advertising platform, Axon. Axon is the most powerful advertising platform in a generation. Axon allows you to capture undivided attention. Axon ads are full screen videos that are watched for an average of 35 seconds. Retention that blows other ad platforms out of the water and you can launch in minutes. You set the goal and Axon achieves it. No complex setup, no expertise needed. And Axon scales quickly. They can put your ads in front of over a billion potential customers. Other businesses have seen immediate results, scale to hundreds of thousands of dollars of spend per day and increase their revenue by millions. And most advertisers aren't even thinking about this channel yet. Less than 1% of advertisers have access to Axon. So, you want to get started quickly and you can do that by going to That is axon.ai/enra. something that again I want to compare your story to Bezos because I just think every time I hear you speak I hear a lot of uh Bezos. He obviously did a ton of customer support at the very beginning of Amazon. He publicized publicized his email and like made it public like email me all the time and one um he tells this great story in one of the books that when he realized you know they were selling at the I think at the time I think just books CDs and like VH maybe DVDs okay and somebody's like he would ask I think he would send an email to like a thousand customers a day or something like that and he's like what else would you buy and one guy's like will you sell me windshield wipers and bas's like oh my god we're going to be able to sell anything

シュー#109

当時は「まだ」と答えた。あの人に電話をかけなきゃ、と思い出す。目標は、時間が経てばあらゆるビジネスの最初の電話になること。今日いちばん多いのは配達の話だが、増えているのは「アプリを作って」「顧客獲得を」「分析・リテンション・サポートを」「在庫保管を」——だからプロダクトを出してきた。うまくいけば、どんな事業を始める最初の電話になれる。1〜2店舗で十分でも、次のマクドナルドやウォルマートを目指してもいい。

EN

or everything in that Um, so yeah, I love that idea. What are these other products that you're building? Okay, we have to like educate me now cuz I figured you need first of all, you need to do more podcasts because I've listened to all of them and I didn't know some of the stuff you're telling me right now, but I know you've launched a bunch of different products during the last 12 months. Tell me about one that you're really excited about.

センラ#110

ベゾスとの類似が止まらない。彼も初期に大量のサポートをし、メールを公開した。本に、本・CD・DVDしか売っていない頃、毎日顧客に「他に何を買う?」と聞いて、「ワイパーを売って」と言われ、「何でも売れる」と気づいた話がある。他にどんなプロダクトを作っている? 過去12ヶ月でローンチした中で、特に興奮しているものは?

EN

Well, one of the things that we're trying to do is we're trying to obviously deliver everything inside the city. Okay. in order to and just to put some you know context behind it. There are tens of millions of items inside of a city that you could deliver. Door Dash delivers a fraction of those items to

シュー#111

街の中のすべてを届けたい。文脈を置くと、1都市に届ける対象になり得るアイテムは何千万。DoorDash が届けるのはそのごく一部。

EN

what fraction do you deliver today?

センラ#112

今はどれくらいの割合?

EN

A very small fraction.

シュー#113

ごく小さい。

EN

Very very small fraction. There are many times the amount of things to deliver than what we currently offer. But there are challenges in in in making these deliveries, right? For instance, you know, how do you actually know what the catalog looks like for what for each city? How do you know if the catalog is actually accurate? What if the items are not available in store but are available in a warehouse somewhere far far away? There are a lot of these challenges in order to actually, you know, address before you can actually do something like deliver everything inside of a city. So, one of the things that we launched um do you talk about like that internally? We're going to deliver everything in a city.

シュー#114

まだ何倍もある。でもカタログの全体像、正確性、店にないが遠い倉庫にある、など課題が多い。昨年秋(9月)に発表した Dasher Fulfillment Solutions は、Kroger や CVS のような会社の商品を、こちらが在庫を持ち、サイトから直接注文でき、こちらが運営する倉庫から届くこともある。倉庫・在庫・物流をまとめて、小売が自分では持ちにくい精度と速さを出す。街全体を届けるには、在庫を人の近くに集約する必要がある。

自律走行も。昨年発表した。ほとんど痛みと苦しみの旅で、ロボタクシーや人の輸送とは違う、ラストマイル配送専用の意図的なプロダクトが要るとわかった。物を車の内外に出し入れする問題、短距離と長距離、重い荷物と軽い荷物。街のすべてを届け、すべてのビジネスに勝機を与えるミッションの一部だ。

EN

And are you making the hardware yourself?

センラ#115

ハードも自社?

EN

Yeah. So, uh, is in some of the cases we are and so we don't have again like the the only religion we really subscribe to is making customers win. Uh, we don't have a religion about whether or not we have to build you know the product or someone else has to build the product. Actually, when we started the autonomous project, the autonomous vehicle project, we started with the um belief that we did not have to build um the vehicles. And in partnering with a lot of different companies, um we ultimately realized that nobody actually wanted to build what we wanted to build. And that's ultimately why we decided to, you know, um start um our own project in 2019 and and you know, shipped it uh last year. So that's what six se seven years almost seven years of development years six years to

シュー#116

場合による。唯一の宗教は顧客を勝たせること。自前か他社かは宗教にしない。自律プロジェクト開始時は「車は作らなくていい」と信じ、多くの会社と組んだが、僕らが欲しいものを誰も作りたがらなかった。だから2019年に自社プロジェクトを始め、昨年出荷した。ほぼ6〜7年の開発。

EN

why did they not want to build they just didn't want to build what you wanted.

センラ#117

なぜ作りたがらなかった?

EN

Yeah. Well if you think about it um in the world of autonomous vehicles you have um a lot of the projects and a lot of the capital and a lot of the attention are going towards rope taxi and that's just a very different solution and form factor um in our opinion than what you need for last mile delivery. you know, when you're it's very hard, for example, to drive a robo taxi into a crowded um hub of merchants, you know, whether it's a mall or, you know, a main street um and actually somehow find parking and actually, you know, get access to, you know, the products by itself somehow. You know, I think that's a that's a that's a difficult endeavor to to accomplish. Um we built actually Door Dash Dot, which actually will yes, it will travel on the road, but it also can travel on the sidewalk and in the bike lanes. Um, it's a much smaller form factor. It doesn't go as fast. Um, but it has the ability to actually get to the last 10 feet of actually, you know, solving the problem of last mile delivery, which really is a last 10 ft problem.

シュー#118

自律の世界では資本と注目がロボタクシーに行く。フォームファクタがラストマイル配送とは違う。混んだ加盟店ハブやモール、メインストリートにロボタクシーを入れて駐車し、勝手に商品にアクセスする——難しい。僕らは DoorDash Dot を作った。道路も歩道も自転車レーンも行く。小さい、速くないが、ラストマイルの本質である最後の10フィートを解ける。

EN

Is this live like right now?

センラ#119

今ライブ?

EN

It's in Arizona. So, it's it's in it's in the Phoenix uh Scottsdale area.

シュー#120

アリゾナ——フェニックス/スコッツデール周辺。

EN

Is it true? I heard that Whimo, you guys have partnered with Whimo to for to close the doors of Is that true?

センラ#121

Waymo と組んで、ドアを閉める問題を手伝っている、という話は本当?

EN

We do. We do partner with Whimo. um and we do lots of things together.

シュー#122

Waymo とは提携している。一緒にいろいろやっている。

EN

Is it people just not shutting the door when they get out of a Whimo? Is that true?

センラ#123

降りるときにドアを閉めない人がいる、という話?

EN

One of the things that I think is fascinating about um uh the problems that a company like a Whimo or a problem like Door or a company like Door Dash has to solve is there's always these uh funny edge cases in the real world that are very hard to predict. Um uh shutting doors may be one of those examples, right? But you actually wouldn't know about that until literally you read the logs of these customer transcripts of, you know, these things. Look, I I I think there's going to be lots of things that we could do together over time. But I I I think it starts with just building the foundation. I I think the foundations you need to build one of these companies for the physical world are just very very different um from the uh from the digital world. And you know, that's kind of the fun part of the exercise at Door Dash.

シュー#124

物理世界のエッジケースは予測しにくい。ドア閉めもその例かもしれない。ログや顧客のやり取りを読まないとわからない。一緒にできることは増えると思うが、出発点は基礎。物理世界の会社を作る基礎は、デジタルとは全然違う。それが DoorDash の楽しさでもある。

EN

Okay. So, let's talk about the talent needed to do all the things that you're describing. I heard you say that when you were recruiting you look for road scholars uh that meet Navy Seals. What does that mean?

センラ#125

いま話していることをやる人材について。「ロードスカラーがネイビーシールと出会った人」を探す、と聞いた。どういう意味?

EN

Yeah, this was uh this was a shortorthhand I suppose early on um when we were looking for I think the types of people that we thought would do well at Door Dash. Um and I think it started um first from by because we did every job ourselves whether it was the deliveries, customer support, making menus, selling restaurants. We recognized the personality type, if you will. Yes, you needed to be smart and and you needed to be able to, you know, have high processing power um in terms of uh um you know, analyzing all the information, especially um in a world that's very unstructured. But one of the things you really needed was you needed to just do things. So much I I I I I think u that that's challenging is um that's very different about the physical world and say building software is you have no control in the physical world. We don't get to control when you hit that order button. We don't get to control whether or not a dasher accepts or rejects an order. We don't get to control how how how slow or how fast somebody makes an item or how in stock or out of stock some item is. you have to be able to do things to go figure those things out. So, one of the earliest things I did I remember was um the interview question if you made it to the interview with me. um your final round interview was most likely a surprise because you know our our teams would you know ask you to you know answer some prompt about fixing some problem in a city or something like that and you probably would go out and do your analyses and um you know um come ready with a one pager of notes or something and then you come to me and you thought you might think that the interview is to present that to me. I would literally ask you, I said, "Well, this could be a really long or really short interview." Um, where I'm going to give you um 20 minutes and you can ask me any question that you want. Um, but after the 20 minutes expires, I'm going to give you $20 that you can use to go and acquire 100 customers for us. Um, and you have 8 hours to do so. But here's also a plane ticket. I know you traveled far to come to this interview in case you want to quit the interview now and just move on and find somewhere else to work and and and and that was the interview because that's the action part, right? So much of um what we were trying to test for um early on is someone who's going to do something to go and collect information as opposed to someone who's going to collect data, scrape information from some, you know, internet protocol and then do some magical analysis on it and then ship code. Okay. I mean, but what if none of that information existed? You have to go and do things in order to actually collect information. That was one big kind of behavior bias for action that we were testing for. So that's the Navy Seal part. That's the Navy Seal part where you have to be willing to do things and be accountable, you know, for things. A lot of that was on the, you know, the non-engineering front. On the engineering front, we looked for engineers who certainly were great at coding, but we looked for engineers who would be willing to do deliveries with us. In fact, the interview with me, if you're an engineer, is the final round interview was we would go and do deliveries together. So the interview would literally take place in my Honda and we would be doing deliveries for maybe an hour or two or something like that. And I'm walking you through the flow of literally the order and asking your opinion of how we could productize this. In Silicon Valley, I think sometimes there's the um mythical obsession with the 10x engineer, right? and and I totally get it and and they do absolutely exist but a lot of times that is about coding prowess. Um that's great. We have a lot of respect for that. Um, at Door Dash, we also need you to have problem solving prowess or the coding prowess and quotes at Door Dash is about how do you solve this end-to-end problem? And it takes a certain kind of engineer who's willing, you know, to to do deliveries. Um, and not just think about code all day or what the latest greatest AI tools are, but is what I'm going to ship actually going to solve a realworld problem? Is there going to be a real customer benefit? Yes or no? That was the type of profile and personality and aptitude and attitude that we're looking for for engineers.

シュー#126

初期の省略表現だ。配達・サポート・メニュー作り・レストラン営業を全部自分でやり、人格タイプがわかった。頭が良く、非構造な情報の処理能力が高い——必要。でもそれ以上に、やる人が要る。物理世界ではコントロールできない。注文ボタンを押す瞬間、ダッシャーの受諾/拒否、調理の遅さ、在庫の有無——わからない。だから動いて確かめる必要がある。

僕との最終面接は、だいたいサプライズだった。チームが「都市のある問題を直せ」みたいなプロンプトを出し、候補者は分析してワンペーサーのメモを用意してくる。僕のところに来て、それをプレゼンする面接だと思っている。そこで僕はこう言う。「この面接はすごく長くも、すごく短くもなる。20分あげる。何でも聞いていい。20分が切れたら、20ドル渡す。それでうちのために顧客を100人獲得して。期限は8時間。遠方から来ているなら、今やめて帰ってもいい——そのための航空券もある」。それが面接だった。

テストしたかったのは行動の側だ。情報を取りに行く人か、プロトコルからスクレイプして魔法の分析をしてコードを出す人か。もしその情報が存在しなかったら? 動いて集めなければいけない。大きな行動バイアス——それがネイビーシール側だ。やる意志と、結果へのアカウンタビリティ。非エンジニア側で特にそうだった。

エンジニア側は、もちろんコーディングが上手い人を探す。同時に、僕らと一緒に配達する意志がある人。エンジニアの最終面接は、ホンダの車内で1〜2時間、一緒に配達することだった。注文のフローを歩きながら、「これをどうプロダクト化するか」と意見を聞く。シリコンバレーには「10xエンジニア」への神話的な執着がある。理解できるし、実在する。多くはコーディング力の話だ。尊重する。DoorDash でも問題解決力——「コーディング力」を引用符付きで言えば、エンドツーエンドの問題をどう解くか——が要る。配達を厭わず、最新のAIツールばかり考えず、「出荷するものは現実世界の問題を解くか。顧客に利益があるか」を問えるタイプ。それが求めていたプロファイルと人格、適性と態度だった。

EN

Was there a specific source where you were finding people like this?

センラ#127

そういう人のソースはあった?

EN

Not really. There wasn't um in fact to this day I don't really look at people's backgrounds that much. I think one of the things I discovered along the way, you know, probably in the 2015 to 2020 era when especially when Door Dash was building out its team, um there were more attributes that I was listening for than there were things on a resume that I was seeking or looking out a bias for action, you know, and a lot of the ways I can tell in an interview is actually just what people naturally talk to me about. You know, for example, Christopher Payne, our first chief operating officer, I didn't ask him a single interview question. Um, but after a two-hour discussion about our logistics algorithm, he went home that night. It was Friday, drove with his son for 4 hours doing deliveries. I didn't ask him to do that. I also didn't ask him the next morning to write me a 30,000word email about why our logistics algorithm sucks. But he did it. But he did it. And that told me more than any set of interview questions.

シュー#128

特にない。今も経歴はあまり見ない。2015〜2020年にチームを厚くした頃、履歴書より聞く属性があった。バイアス・フォー・アクションは、自然に何を話すかでわかる。初代COOのクリストファー・ペインには面接質問を一つもしなかった。物流アルゴリズムの2時間の議論のあと、金曜の夜に息子と4時間配達に行き、翌朝「物流アルゴリズムがダメな理由」の3万語メールを送ってきた。頼んでいない。どんな面接質問より多くを教えてくれた。

EN

You hadn't even hired him yet.

センラ#129

まだ雇っていなかった。

EN

No, hadn't hired Hadn't hired him yet.

シュー#130

雇っていなかった。

EN

And then you immediately

センラ#131

履歴書の向こう——最低レベルのディテールで動けるか。

EN

And this is certainly this is certainly beyond the resume, right? Um or you know, we look for the ability to operate at the lowest level of detail.

シュー#132

今のプレジデントで当時CFO候補との初回は、45分のコーヒーチャットの予定だった。彼はノートPCと、財務の巨大なプロジェクションファイルを持ってきた。「知り合いになるだけの予定では?」と思ったが、それが彼の思考回路だ。履歴書を読まなくても、どう働くかが見える。

EN

I remember my first um it was actually supposed to be a coffee chat, not a quote unquote interview. It was scheduled for 45 minutes with our um you know now president then CFO candidate and he came to the coffee with his computer and this like multimegabyte file which was some projection of our financials somehow. I said, "What?" Like, like this was this is supposed to be me getting we're supposed to get to know each other and this but but this is how he thinks, right? Like I don't need to watch the resume or read the resume to decipher how does this person work. He showed it to you.

センラ#133

モデルを作って一緒に歩いた。

EN

So he built a model and then he walks you through.

シュー#134

4時間以上、行ごとに議論した。他にも3〜4の属性がある——どう動くか、何で動くか、どんな環境で最大の成果が出るか、DoorDash に合うか。秘密のソース(特定企業・学校)はなかった。

EN

Yeah.

センラ#135

完全デジタルなソフトウェア会社で満足する人とは違うのでは。初期にダッシャー20人と Uber X 20人に、時給保証20ドルの上で「25ドルで転職する?」という実験をした話があった。

EN

How long did that take? We I think debated it for over four hours that that so it was like and but it was literally going line by line to think through that these kinds of examples ultimately and then there's like you know three or four other attributes that we look for those tell me more about I think how you operate what makes you tick what's the environment in which you'd be most successful and whether or not I think it matches um what's required so there wasn't there wasn't like a source it wasn't like oh yeah we discovered the secret that it's this company or this school or this background that ultimately

シュー#136

当時約20ドルで、スイッチしたら25ドル保証。Uber X→DoorDash、DoorDash→Uber。40人中、動いたのは1人だけ。

EN

but don't they have to be very different people than would be people satisfied working in like just a completely digital like software company like you told this story one time where you were wondering um let me see if I remember correctly correct me if I'm wrong but like you took like a small sample of like 20 Dasher drivers and 20 Uber X drivers

センラ#137

そこから何を導いた?

EN

and I think the control of this experiment was like you all are getting guaranteed $20 an hour

シュー#138

創業直後の週単位。3問の一つ——十分なダッシャーを獲得できるか——に関わる。ドライバーが金だけなら負ける。デイビッドを運ぶ方がブリトーやコーヒーより価値がある。仮説を確かめようとして実験した。

結果、まったく別の二つの集団だった。DoorDash 側は若く、約半数が女性。バイク、スクーター、自転車、車——車だけじゃない。Uber X は当時ほぼ40代男性、ほぼ全員四輪。フルタイムに近く、タクシー1.0から2.0への移行。ダッシャーは学校・病院・レストラン・小売・サービス・母親など多様。今日もライドシェアと配達の重なりはほぼなく、ダッシャーの半数超が女性。平均は週3〜4時間、90%は週10時間未満。セレクションが違う。

EN

if I offer you more money how many of these groups would switch

センラ#139

自分で選び分けた。

EN

yes Right. And what was the observation that you discovered from this experiment? Do you remember?

シュー#140

自己選抜だ。

EN

Yeah. So, um yeah, they were making about 20 an hour at the time. I made a guaranteed offer of 25 an hour if the if you switch jobs. So, if the Uber X- drivers would go to Door Dash, Door Dash would go to Uber. And one out of two groups of 20. So, one out of 40 made the move.

センラ#141

ボロボロのホンダに乗って配達するエンジニアを、Google で豪華なランチを食べるソフトウェアエンジニアとどう見つけるか、という話につながる。

EN

And what did you derive and conclusion draw from that?

シュー#142

全然違う。初期は午後10時にコーディングの休憩を取ってゴミを出した——アパートで清掃業者はいない。自分たちが清掃だった。そういう環境を望むエンジニア・人が要る。プロの経歴というより個人の背景に近かったかもしれない。共通していたのは、行動バイアス、ディテールへの関心、対立するアイデアを同時に持てること、フォロワーシップ——彼らが動くと他の人がついてくること。

EN

And this was very early. I this is weeks within the companies getting uh uh started because at the time one of the one of the um you know back to the three questions we're trying to answer we're trying to figure out whether or not we could acquire enough dashers enough drivers was well if drivers only cared about money well we're ultimately going to lose because obviously it's more valuable to transport David than a burrito or a coffee and and so we were testing this you know we were almost you know trying to confirm or to deny this hypothesis so I ran that experiment what What I learned was well actually they're two groups of completely different people. The Door Dash drivers um they were younger about half of them were female or women and they had all sorts of vehicles. Some of them drove motorcycles um scooters, bikes, uh yes cars but but but but not exclusively cars. The Uber X drivers at the time were um usually men in their 40s. Um I think almost exclusively men. Maybe there were a few women in the group, but almost exclusively men. Um all of them drove vehicles, cars, uh sorry, four-wheelers. And and they viewed that job almost like a full-time job. You know, in some ways they're moving from taxi 1.0 to taxi 2.0. and because some of them had formerly duh drove for taxi. The the dashers on the other hand came from a variety of places, schools, hospitals, restaurants, retailers, service businesses, moms. I and and then if you look at it today, there's almost no overlap, very little overlap between ride sharing drivers and delivery drivers. And the dashers, more than half of them are women today. They come from dozens of industries literally I mean um every place the average dasher only does three to four hours a week 90% do drive fewer than 10 hours a week and so it just became a very different setup you know the delivery

センラ#143

採用で面白い。もう一度。

EN

they kind of self- selected into what

シュー#144

フォロワーシップ。なぜかはわからないが、前職で周りに同種の集団が集まり、いつも上達したがる。必ずしもプロのスキルだけでなく、最高のバーガー職人、最高のカラオケ歌手になりたくて、週末の改善プロセスを語る。DoorDash が制度化したい科学的プロセスととても似ている。何かへの執着と、自分で上達システムを作っていること——会社名よりそれを見た。

EN

they self- selected

センラ#145

「DoorDash はバイアス・フォー・アクションで議論を解決する会社。あまり議論せず、週に何十万の実験を出す」——会議室で仮説を長く描くより、実験で真理に最短で行く。

EN

I wonder if there's that insight that you derived there is like it's kind of what I'm getting to is like how do you find the people like the engineer that is willing to go get in your shitty Honda no offense

シュー#146

物理世界では分析できない/反直感的なことが多いから。パロアルトとSFの両方で配達しなければ、「郊外の方が速く/経済的に配達できる」に着地しなかったかもしれない。稼いだ秘密だ。サム・ウォルトンの自伝を読んだ?

EN

and do yeah I feel like that that is such different person than it's a software engineer at Google.

センラ#147

かなり前に。

EN

It's a super feeasant or something for lunch.

シュー#148

競合のシアーズやKmart は都市中心にいて、先にアイデアを持っていた。彼はベントンビルの小さな町に資源制約でいた。金がなかったから小さな町から始めた。だから「小さな町にどれだけ需要があるか」に気づけた。稼いだ秘密は、Everyday Low Prices——同じ品をより安く売れば、人は遠くからでも来る、という人間性。

EN

Yeah, it's super different. Yeah, it's exactly. No, I I think you said it yourself. I mean, if you think about, you know, the the the early days, it was I mean I remember we would at and it's a strange memory, but um we would take a coding break at 10 p.m. to take out the trash because it was an apartment. So, it wasn't like an office building where there was, you know, janitorial services. we were janitorial and and so we would take out the trash. It takes a certain kind of engineer. It takes a certain kind of person to actually want to work in that environment. But I don't think there was like a background. If anything, it was probably like a personal background as opposed to a professional one in which um we were looking for. But I I I think all of these people had a bias for action. All of them cared about the details. All of them had the ability to hold opposing ideas in their brains. All of them had strong followership. They tended to move with others as they moved from one once they joined a company a bunch of others followed them.

センラ#149

ホームデポのバーニー・マーカスも、数十年後に別業種で同じ気づきを得た。

EN

Oh, that's an interesting trait to hire for. Say say that about that again.

シュー#150

制約は創造を生む。初期に資金調達がうまくいかなかったから実験せざるを得なかった。マーケ予算で競合に勝てないなら、残る競争手段はより良いリテンションとエンゲージメントのプロダクトだけだ。

EN

Yeah, it's around followership. Okay. they had the they had this ability where um and I I didn't even know the why many times but when you just look at you know you know company A they worked for organization A they started whatever and they tend to have these groups that are attracted to them and they're tend to be quite like-minded um they tend to always want to get better. That was one trait that we discovered. And you know, and you see this, it's not always professionally like trying to get better at some skill all the time. Sometimes it was they wanted to be the best burger maker or they wanted to be the best karaoke singer and they would literally like tell you about their process in which they would on the weekends improve every single week. But that's not that different from if you think about the scientific process that we're recruiting for or trying to institute in our systems here at Door Dash. It's very similar actually, very very very similar. There was an obsession almost um to some activity uh and there was a system that they devised for themselves to actually get better. Those were the traits that we looked for as opposed to what company did you work for etc. You have a great quote where it says, uh, Door Dash has always been a company where bias for action is the way we solve and settle debates. We don't debate a lot. We tend to ship hundreds of thousands of experiments a week. So, you're not saying an office or that conference room behind us mapping things out and like, oh, I have an hypothesis. You're just like, "No, we're just going to experiment. We're going to get to the truth as fast as possible."

センラ#151

今の巨大シードラウンドをどう見る?

EN

Yeah. I I I I think Well, because so much of the phys big part of this is because the physical world, so much of it is there is no analysis you can run on it sometimes. and and or and or or or or it can be very counterintuitive. Um and you know, for example, had we not done deliveries in both Palo Alto and San Francisco, maybe we never would have landed on the idea that you could deliver maybe faster or more economically inside of a quote unquote suburb than a city. It's almost like an earned secret. You read um Sam Walton's autobiography

シュー#152

印象的だ。創業者への励ましは、まず解く価値のある問題を見つけ、見つけたら実際に解け、だ。それが財務指標をカバーする。金が増えれば勝つ、と思いがちだが、歴史が好きな君に——デイビッド・マッカロウの『ライト兄弟』は読んだ?

EN

a long time ago.

シュー#153

読んでないならオーディオブックでも。人間の動力飛行は何世紀もの問題で、同時期に資金もブランドもある競合がいた。

EN

he his main competitors Sears Kmart there was people had the idea before he did and they're like they're in the city center. He's like well I'm in Bentonville. I'm in like he basically said like if we didn't he he was resource constrained and so he's like I didn't have a lot of money so I had to start out in these lot these small towns and if I didn't never did that because I was forced to because I didn't have the money that Kmart or the other competitors had. I didn't realize how much business there was out in these little towns. And then the earned secret that he had was if he could compete on his his you know organizing mantra was everyday low prices. If I can actually sell this same item to you cheaper, people would drive in human nature vast diff distances to save money.

センラ#154

サミュエル・ラングレー。スミソニアンの後ろ盾で、当時としては巨額の約50万ドル。

EN

Yes.

シュー#155

ライト兄弟は自転車店のささやかな利益で何世紀の問題を解き、費用は約1500ドル、と本にある。大好きな話だ。

EN

And what was interesting is Bernie Marcus, founder of Home Depot, realized that same exact uh idea like 30 or 40 years later applied to a different um different different

センラ#156

君が「自分は資金調達が下手なんだ」と冗談めかしていたのも好きだ。1000日の地獄——ビジネスの内部指標は全部良い方向だったのに。何が起きていた?

EN

industry. Trains definitely breed I mean creativity. I mean for us because we had no money or because I was so unsuccessful you know raising money in the earliest years we had to run these experiments. If you think about it if a company has no ability to compete with budget and other companies are outspending them with marketing dollars as an example. You only have one way to compete which is you have to build a product that has better retention better engagement. You have to there's no other way.

シュー#157

創業者・CEOとして最初に学ぶ難しいことの一つは、自分の心理をコントロールすること。コントロール外で意味不明なことが起きる。DoorDash でもごく初期から。シード調達の苦しさ、スタンフォードの試合でキャッシュがさらに減る——生き延び、シードを取り、A・Bはホットで1週間未満で closure したこともある。

2016年春、いくつかのことが起きた。自分の心理と向き合い始めた最初の時期でもある。創業から約3年で初めての休暇——妻と5日、ハワイ。ハネムーンに行っていなかったので埋め合わせ。実は Series C のインバウンドのタームシートがあり、冬のうちにクローズしたいと投資家に言った。「休暇を取れ。ハネムーンに行け。大丈夫だ」と言われ、普段は早く終わらせるタイプだが妻への借りもあり従った。戻ると公場が急落。LinkedIn や Salesforce が1週間で30〜40%落ち、Twitter 上でバブル崩壊の論調。すぐプライベート調達に波及し、DoorDash のラウンドからも引く投資家が出た。

そこから約3年——DoorDash がピアのごく一部しか調達できず、キャッシュアウト寸前を何度も経験する期間——が始まった、と言っていい。内部には緊張があった。外では市況が悪化し、ナラティブが一気に反転した。「ホットだった会社」が、急に「何も正しくできない会社」になる。儲からない。永遠に赤字だ。資金の厚い競合には勝てない。当時は Uber や Amazon が参入してくる/すでにいる/拡大を告げる時期でもあった。仮に勝っても負ける、金を失い続けるビジネスだ、という見出しや、見出しの背後のテーマがあった。

一方で、内部の指標を見ると、起業家として望む方向に全部動いていた。都市AからB、Cへの再現性。ユニットエコノミクスの改善。会社が利益を出していない理由は、常に新市場を立ち上げ続けていたからだ。新市場は初期投資が要る——ビジネスがなくてもドライバーを路上に保てるように払う必要がある。それが内部で起きていた。マクロと投資のサイクルに嵌まり、セクターが有毒に見え、会社は何も正しくできない——その約3年が、自分の心理の扱いを学ばせた期間だった。

EN

So what do you think when you see these giant like seed rounds that we're seeing now? It's impressive is what I think. I think it's really my encouragement to those founders is to actually find a problem um worth solving first, but then once you find the problem to actually go and solve the problem because at the end of the day that's going to cover for you know whatever financial you know metrics um that they're going to be solving for. Yeah. One of my favorite um because everybody's like well I need more money because if I have more money I win. And one of my favorite historical anecdotes. You ever read the biography of the Wright brothers by David McCulla?

センラ#158

どう対処した?

EN

No.

シュー#159

一つのやり方ではない。まず、DoorDash は知的に正直な場所なので、何がリアルかと、人が言っていることを分ける。全員が一部屋に入る頃のオールハンズでは、現金残高を含む全指標を見せた。残高はX軸に向かって減り、人は不安になる。「ビジネスは右肩上がりなのに残高が減る」と良い質問が出る。マーケチームも予算もなかった。混乱していた。

ジョブ1は、コントロールできることに集中して会社を最良の位置に置くこと。さもなくば自分が狂い、会社の成功確率も下がる。重要領域を担う20〜25人を集め、「成長しシェアを取り続ける」「もっと利益を出す」「キャッシュを切らさない」——or ではなく and——と言い続けた。市場や記事や投資家の断りに執着したら狂う。

第二に、仕事上の本物の友人を持つこと。金融・商業・履歴書の成功だけじゃない。永遠のミッションへの冒険で、最悪でも死にかけながらやる。スタンフォードの試合の夜と同じ。DoorDash が残ってほしいが、翌日を越えるのは「チームメイトを成功させたい」だ。自分の問題だけじゃない視点が、通過を少し楽にした。

第三に、変わらないものの上に何かを建てる——運動のルーティンを保った。中身は変わったが、当時はマラソンなど。妻とのデートナイトも。全部がコントロール外・カオス・ネガティブな中の定数。毎日期待どおりではなかったが、振り返ると、ノートに毎日書いて自分に言い聞かせていたのはそういうことだ。

EN

Oh, I know you like to read history.

センラ#160

コントロールできるものをコントロールする。自分より大きなミッション。意志力はいつか尽きる——1000日超えで、投資家からの No は何回?

EN

I do. I should probably I should probably check that one out.

シュー#161

50回で数えるのをやめた。100は超えていた。

EN

Listen to the audio book if you I know you're busy. Um it's it's great because you know human powered fight was a centuries old problem. Like people were trying to figure it out over and over again. Uh the right at the same exact time the Wright brothers were trying to do it. They had better funded competitors, better brand names.

センラ#162

すごい。今も株価を見ない、とロビー・グプタのポッドキャストで。時価総額を聞かれて「わからない」と返し、相手に思い出させた、と。

EN

Sure.

シュー#163

今もそうだ。コントロールできないし、やりがいでも動機でもない。決算でファイナンスが思い出させることはあるが、株価を知って毎日の行動は変わらない。ルーティンは、年を当てるチーム、未来を発明するチーム、そして顧客——その時間の使い方だ。

EN

I think it was Samuel Lang Samuel Langley was I think backed by like the Smithsonian. And I think he'd raised like $500,000. This is like a crazy amount of money there. And uh there's a great line in the book where like uh essentially the Wright brothers solved the centuries old problem with the modest profits from their bicycle business and they tallied up how much it cost them. It was like $1,500.

センラ#164

またベゾス。Amazon で株が180から6くらいまで落ちた時期、内部指標は良くなり続けていたから一時的だと知っていた、と。オペレーターには2つのマネジメントシステムが要る、という話——さっきのヒントに繋がる。

EN

That's incredible.

シュー#165

プロダクトマーケットフィットを見つけ、オーガニック成長と現金を生む自走ができたら、特権としての選択がある。やり続けか、ミッションのために拡張か。Amazon や大きなテックが刺激的なのは、同時に二つをやるからだ。コア——顧客からの認識と、投資できる財務の土台——を回しつつ、次のものを作る。

二つのシステムは違う。一方は自分をほぼディスラプトする次バージョン、10倍良いものを作りながらマシンを回す——大きな旅客機を飛ばしながら空中でエンジン交換するようなもの。もう一方は紙飛行機。乗客はいない。再びPMFを探す。成功の測り方、人材、リソース、進捗の時間軸、誤差の幅が違う。大きな飛行機が成功するほど、紙飛行機を多く持ち、高くつくこともある。ミッションのために大きな事業を動かし続けるショットが要る。

EN

Which I absolutely love. I want to go back. Uh you you make some jokes uh that I maybe there were jokes, but I laughed when I heard you say this that you're like, I must be a really bad fundraiser.

センラ#166

PMF後をスケールする人と発明する人は分ける?

EN

What is this like thousand days of hell? Can you talk about this for your you're trying to tell and it's weird because the the the metrics in the business were all trending in the positive direction, right? They were.

シュー#167

できるだけ。

EN

So explain what the hell was going on.

センラ#168

建物まで分ける?

EN

Well, so one of the hardest things I think you you learn as a founder and certainly as a CEO is you have to learn how to control your own psychology because there's lots of things that are going to be out of your control and that won't make sense to you. And this happened very early um you know with Door Dash. Um, I mentioned earlier that we had uh a difficult time raising the seed round and then this, you know, difficult uh event at with Stanford football in which we we ran out of even our money faster. Um, but we survived that. Um, we raised the seed round. Our series A, series B were hot rounds. You know, we uh we I don't know somehow was able to raise money in less than a week, something like that in each one of those instances. But in the spring of um 2016, you know, a few things happened and this is probably when I first started learning about the importance of dealing with your own psychology. It was actually the first time I took a vacation. Uh I think it was so we started the company June uh I guess January 2013 June January 2013 January of 2016. So about 3 years or so. So I'm first vacation 5 days with my wife. We didn't go on a honeymoon. So I promised her that uh that we should we should make up for that. And so we go for 5 days I think to Hawaii. And uh we were uh actually we had received an inbound term sheet actually. So things were going pretty well um to raise our series C in the winter of 2015 in the spring of 16. And I asked I remember specifically asking the investor um why don't we just close this like you know why don't we just close this now like before the year. He's like no don't worry about it. You've never taken a vacation. Go take go take your honeymoon. Everything's going to be fine. um you know, we're we're we're good for it. And I said, "Okay, all right. I I I'll go with you on this one." You know, my intention and my my my style is usually to get things done quickly. But I said, "I'll go with you on this one. I I owe this to my wife. So, we we go to Hawaii, have a great time, come back in January, and the markets actually tank, the public markets." Um so, that's the first thing that happens. you know, companies at the time, companies I remember, I think it was like LinkedIn when they were still a independent public company or Salesforce, they drop 30 40% something like that in value in a matter of like a week or something. Um, all of a sudden analysts and, you know, uh, Twitter at the time, you know, maybe wasn't as big as X is today, but they had all the commentary about how, oh, this is the beginning of the end, right? Finally, like the bubble's going to burst. And that very quickly trickles to the private sector uh private uh companies and private financings where investors start backing out um including from the Door Dash series. And so this is the start I would say of three years. So, you know, um, where Door Dash could raise very little money, a fraction of what our peers could raise and where we encounter several bouts of almost running out of cash. But you're right, there was this tension internally because, okay, so here we are. It's the markets are going down. All of a sudden, the narrative for Door Dash was this, you know, really hot company now is a company that can do no right. You you can't ever make money. You can't beat all these competitors who are better funded. At the time there was Uber, there was Amazon um uh uh who were who were either coming in or who already were in or announcing you know um more expansion. Um and even if you win, you're going to lose because this is a money losing business or a forever money losing business. Those are kind of some of the headlines or the the themes behind the headlines. But at the same instance, you look at the the metrics on the inside and you actually see everything going the direction that you would hope as an entrepreneur. You see repeatability from city A to city B to city C. You see unit economics improving. And the reason why the company wasn't profitable is because we were constantly launching new markets. And new markets require investment in the beginning because you're actually paying um for drivers to make sure that they can stay on the road even when you have no business. Um and so that was what was happening internally. That happened for about 3 years though. um where it we were kind of stuck in this one of these cycles, macro cycles, investment cycles where the company could do no right. The sector was viewed as toxic and that was certainly, you know, probably the three years in which I certainly had to learn how to deal with my own psychology.

シュー#169

物理分離より、目標・ゴール・インセンティブのシステムを分ける方が重要だ。DoorDash は40カ国超で、全員を同じ場所には置けない。追跡・管理・測定・インセンティブの分離が本質だ。

EN

So, how were you doing that?

センラ#170

リソース配分——時間・人・実験へのチップ——はどう決める?

EN

There was no one way. I I think the first thing is you have to make sure that um I think a lot of times it's very easy to believe in your own And so the first thing you know I think a place like Door Dash which is very intellectually honest is well what's what's actually real um versus what maybe people are saying and so we used to do this u because we could fit all in one conference room the all hands I would show every metric in the company um including our cash balance which is obviously going towards the x-axis and people are getting nervous but people are asking a very good question which is Tony I don't get it the cash balance is coming down but the business is going the opposite direction. It's going up and to the right. And the way that in a very organic way, we weren't spending. We didn't even have a marketing team, let alone a marketing budget. We didn't have money. People were very confused. So, job number one to me was actually put the company in the best possible place by focusing on what we could control because otherwise I'm going to go crazy. I'm I'm going to go crazy and we're actually now going to, you know, put the company in the best chance of success. And so we got a group of I think it was maybe 20 25 people. The people that kind of ran a lot of different important areas and basically brought them under the 10 said look we have to do the following. We got to keep growing and keep taking share. We got to get more profitable and we can't run out of cash. And there's no ore in any of these statements. It's an and function across all these statements. And that was ultimately what I just kind of kept obsessing over, you know, because if I obsessed over anything else, the markets or what people were writing about us or another rejection from an investor, if I just obsessed over what was not in my control, I think I was going to go certainly nuts. That was, you know, certainly part one, focusing on what I can control. Part two I think is and this is another lesson I learned during during those years is that I think this can be risky but I actually think that it's really important and undervalued to have to have genuine friends at work and meaning that this can't just be about a financial success or a commercial success or some professional success on the resume that there is this adventure if you will that we're on on this worthy the eternal mission and that at least we're going to die trying, right? Worst case, we're going to die trying. Kind of like the Stanford football example day. Yes, of course, we want Door Dash to make it, but what gets you through the next day isn't thinking about Door Dash as much as I just want to make you to be successful, like my teammate to be successful. And so this willingness to think about someone else in addition to just thinking about your own problems, I think actually made this a bit easier to go through. And then the final thing is, you know, back to trying to find to build anything out of things that don't change. One thing that I've been able to keep throughout the Door Dash chapter so far is just my exercise routine. So it the the routine itself has changed, but you know, back then I was really into running marathons, things like that. just keeping that up, having something that was a bit of a constant in my life, whereas everything else was out of my control, extremely chaotic, usually extremely negative. And part of the routine was also date nights with my wife. So, there was no one thing to answer your question about how to manage my own psychology. And trust me, I didn't, you know, have my thing all together during every single period. But that was kind of when I look back, what were the things that got me through it? What were the things that I kept trying to tell myself, you know, in my notebook of what to do every single day? Those were the things.

シュー#171

全部を自分が決めたら遅くなる。基準とペースは自分が設定する、と仕事の多くを見ている。アイデアは誰でも出せる。リーダーだけが発案してはいけない。問題に近い人がアイデアを持ち、実験で顧客が欲しいと示せたら、計画プロセスで追求を評価する。プロジェクトA・B・Cにチップをいくつ賭けるか。全部が同時スタートではない。古いものも生まれたばかりもある。社内ベンチャーのようにステージゲート。最初に全額は渡さず、次のステージの権利を稼ぐ。顧客問題をどれだけ解けたかで。

この発想は DoorDash 自身の歴史から来た。少ない資源から始まり、PMFが進むにつれ資源が増えた。いちばん顧客問題を解いたのは、いちばん資源制約が強いときが多かった。何かがあるかは発明者が決められず、買う顧客が決める。現状の10倍良いものを作れるか。できたらスケールする。スタート費用が高い問題もあるが、相対的には最初は小さく渡す。

EN

Yeah. You control what you control. And I love this idea of having a mission bigger than yourself

センラ#172

ピアからも学ぶ? トビ・ルトケ(Shopify)の回は新番組でいちばん誇れる一本だった。世界級の創業者に「誰から学ぶ?」と聞くとトビの名が何度も出る。予測不能な非相関アイデアを話す。君のピアグループや学んでいる相手は?

EN

because you have this great line where it's like at some point willpower is going to give out. Like your own personal willpower is going to give out. Especially cuz you're doing this is over a thousand days. How many rejections? How many nos are you getting from investors?

シュー#173

トビは本当にすごい。ピアの一部は一緒に育った人たちだ。YC の利点はコミットの強制だけでなくピアグループでもある。2010年代、Airbnb、Stripe、Coinbase など同じ時代に並んで育った。バッチは完全一致しなくても、イベントや場で知り合い、ノートを交換し、それぞれ苦難と勝利を持っている。先を行く会社からも学ぶ。本業以外で Meta のボードに少し関わっていて、マーク(ザッカーバーグ)のような、別スケールの創業者から学ぶ。

EN

I stopped counting after 50, but it was over 100.

センラ#174

マークについて。収録前に話した通り、彼と同世代で近い人がほぼいない年齢で、印象は予想以上だった。ボードで観察して学んだことは?

EN

That's incredible. To this day though, you don't I heard uh so we have a mutual friend of Robbie Gupta. Yeah. And you went on his podcast and uh you said, "I don't look at the stock price. You try to get everybody else not to pay in the company to pay tre." And he goes, "You had to remind me of our market cap because I don't know what it is."

シュー#175

いちばん印象的なのは、常に新しいことを学ぶ意志。成功の罠は、苦しいときの心理だけでなく、うまくいったあと掴み続けることでもある。マークと Meta のチームには、自分を再発明する意志がある。VR/AR という別プラットフォームへの早期ベット、AI への全力。プラットフォーム転換や新技術の初期に「正しいか」のデータは少ない。成功が見える前にベットする。ルーキーになり、つまずき、批判され、誤解され、答えを知らない——以前の成功の対極——に入る意志。常に初心者としてアリーナに入り、汗と血と労苦と苦闘をする。それがすごい。

EN

Yes. Yes. That's still the case today.

センラ#176

二人とも柔術が好き。柔術から本業に持ち帰ったものは?

EN

Yeah. I mean, I I I back to the things that I can control, you know? Well, I mean, usually our our finance team will remind me of the market cap during earnings calls and things like this, but like but sincerely speaking, it's not something I get to control and it's also not what is fulfilling or motivating to me. You know, what am I going to do on a daily basis knowing what the stock price like? Am I going to behave any No, I'm not going to behave any differently. Um, I'm probably going to still stick to my routine, which is I'm going to spend time with, you know, our teams that are, you know, trying to make sure that they can hit the year. there's one group and the team that is trying to invent the future and there's several of those teams and then with customers that's how I spend my time.

シュー#177

柔術は物理的なチェスだ、という言い方が近い。

EN

I want to talk about that. I I just be remiss not to mention this because again I don't know why every time I hear you speak and now having this conversation with you personally it's like there's just so much like Jeff Bezoses stuff going on here. I think you already know this, but there was a time in Amazon history where he talks about this and I think I don't know what the exact numbers were but the stock price went from like 180 down to like six. And his whole point I think he talks about this in his shareholders I think it dropped like 90% or whatever the number was

シュー#178

同時に対立する性質を持つ。最高の柔術家は極めて強く・硬い一方で、極めてリラックスしている。意図的なゲームプランを持ちつつ、ポジションを失いそうならナノ秒でアジェンダを捨てる。柔軟性を、個人生活でも DoorDash でも教えようとしている。もう一つは、どんなクラフトでも同じだが、毎日1%良くなる意志。ポジション、柔軟性、バランス——小さなことが複合する。エリートは銀の弾丸を探さず、技のエッジ、細部を語る。最高レベルではポイントですらなく、アドバンテージで決まることもある。クラフトを磨き続けるリマインダーだ。

EN

Yeah. So, if you're so lucky as an entrepreneur to one day find product market fit um where you can organically grow um and and and and build a business that's self-sustaining that generates cash, in other words, you have the privilege now of making a choice. That choice is, you know, keep doing what I'm doing um or to keep um expanding in in service of our mission. And when you look at I think um and and one of the reasons why I I think Amazon is inspiring or um a lot of these big tech companies now actually um is they tend to do two things at the same time. One is they continue to build the core business the business that kind of got them you know to their place both in terms of their place with customers in terms of what they're known for as well as their financial place where they can invest from. but they also do new things and they you know launch the next thing or the next thing or you know um they're trying to create the next thing and those are two very different systems you know one system is about making sure that you can constantly reinvent yourself almost you're trying to build the next version of the product to disrupt yourself to build something that is 10 times better than what you have today um while you're also running the machine at the same time right so it's like you are flying the airplane. It's a big airplane. You're carrying lots of passengers and you're going to do a midair engine transplant, right? That's one type of system um that that you're constantly trying to build. And then there's new stuff there. It's not even an airplane. It's like a paper stick airplane. It's like a paper airplane. There are no passengers, no nothing. You're in search of product market fit all over again. And they required different ways in which you measure success. They require usually different talent. Um they require a different amount of resourcing. They have vastly different timelines in terms of rate of progress and they tend to have a lot larger airbounds on some of these newer areas. And and it's really hard to do because the more successful your big airplane is, the more probably paper airplanes you're going to have to have. And they may be very expensive some of those, you know, paper airplanes that you're going to build. um because you need more shots on goal to keep up, you know, um the kind of this this big business that you're trying to move um in ser in service of your mission.

センラ#179

AIが会社の回し方をどう変えているか。「AIのような技術進歩は、会社の回し方の新しい手段を与えた」とも言っていた。どう使っている?

EN

So the people scaling the the businesses in Door Dash that are post product market fit, right? And then the inventors are they are do you separate these people in

シュー#180

月ごとに変わる。将来また話せば答えは違うかもしれない。まず、スケールしないことから出荷までの学習システムについて。いまのエージェントは、コーディングのような機能タスクには強い。クロスファンクショナル領域はまだ。コーディング内では、職能を問わずアイデア→プロトタイプ→実験と分析→小集団への出荷まで一人で回せる。学習ループが縮む。すごい。

第二に、LLMが人間より得意なのは、ほぼ無限の記憶とコンテキスト、あらゆるファイル横断の検索。問題は正しい情報をどう食わせるか。食わせられれば、同じ活動で人間より良くできる。学習プロセスの加速と、手作業の効率と効果の両方の改善——この二領域だ。

EN

We try to.

センラ#181

集めている物理データで、大きなモデル会社と組むメリットは? それともプロプライエタリに保つ?

EN

Okay. Separate buildings. How how extreme? No, no, no. I was just saying like do you even take it to that extreme like separating

シュー#182

DoorDash を良いサービスとして回す情報の多くは自社で使う。情報を渡すだけではポジティブな結果にならない。データが示唆する行動が要る。欠品、ダッシャーが違う場所にいて顧客を見つけられない——情報のあと、欠けた品を取る、顧客を見つける、という行動が要る。エンドツーエンドのジョブで顧客に評価される。エンドツーエンドをより良く解ける相手とは組む。行動が伴わない受け渡しだけは難しい。

EN

separating them like physically like how do you do this?

センラ#183

創業時の競合はファックスで、今はAIの時代。13年でこの旅だ。

EN

Yeah, usually that happens but that that's that that that that I don't know if is as important as you need very different goals, goaling systems and incentive systems. Um and you know that is probably more important than physically necessarily where they are per se. Um you know some you know Door Dash today also you know operates in more than 40 countries. So it's it's tough to get every single person in exactly the same location. Um but you know it's very important though to to to separate how you actually track, manage, measure, incentivize um you know these projects. And so that that's more what I'm referring to.

シュー#184

13年だ。

EN

Are you making these decisions about like we're going to allocate this amount of resources, this amount of time, this amount of people to these experiments? Like how does how do you actually structure this?

センラ#185

最後にこの引用で締めたい。「専門家になる最善の方法は、ただ仕事をすること。驚くほど早く専門家になれる」

EN

Yes and no. I mean, if I had to make every single decision, I mean, Door Dash would certainly move a lot slower than than than we would um want to move. Um, but certainly I have to set the standards and the pace, if you will. You know, that's kind of what I view a lot um of my job. And um and so usually how it works is um well, first of all, anyone should be able to come up with an idea. It it can't be somehow that only the leaders come up with the idea. Usually it's the people closest to the problems that actually come up with the ideas or have the ideas and you know if they can run an experiment you know back to uh this process that actually demonstrates some viability of success that customers actually want this product then it starts um you know entering the phase where we can evaluate whether or not we should actually pursue it during our planning process. And you know through the planning process then we decide you know okay well how many chips should we bet in project A versus B versus C. And some projects look they're not all starting at the same time. Some projects are older. Some project projects just got born. And so it's almost like an internal venture system if you will where it's stage gated. There is no oh you get all the money up front and no um you kind of have to earn your right to the next stage and um and that's going to be based on how well you're solving that customer problem. Where did you get that idea from the this internal stage getting like essentially treating it as like internal venture capital? Well, I you know, a lot of it came from Door Dash's own history where Door Dash kind of worked this way, right? And and maybe some of it wasn't in the exact, you know, formulation we wanted, but um that's how Door Dash was born. You know, you started with little resources or not a lot. Um and as we got progressively more um successful or or discover more product market fit, we were given more resources. And to me, when I think about the the things that we um built that were the most um that most solve customer problems, it tended to be when we were most resource constrainted. And it's just so I I I do feel like that's important to to know whether because the most important thing again when you're starting something is do you really have something or or you just you know believing that you have something and you don't get to make that call as the inventor. It's the customers that you're inventing for that ultimately are going to tell you whether or not they're going to buy or not. And so that's the most important thing. We're we're trying to make sure that we actually can create something that is 10 times better than the status quo. Um and then if we can do that, yeah, of course we'll keep scaling. Now some projects cost more money to start, but that's just the nature of the problem, but we're still relative to its size giving it a small amount of budget to begin with.

シュー#186

美しい。

EN

Are you also learning from your peers? Like the reason I ask is because uh we just did I think one of the episodes I'm most proud of so far for this new show is the one we did with Toby Luke. Okay. And I was really excited to talk to Toby because I'm constantly asking world class founders, who are you learning from? Tobyy's like your favorite founder's favorite founder and his name kept coming up over and over again. And that was the conversation I had where it's like you ask a question and you you cannot predict what's going to come out of his mouth next cuz he has all these like uncorrelated ideas which makes for a very like fascinating conversation. So, like what are who are the people that like you've either built relationships with or you've like studied like your peer group uh that you're also like learning from and like taking ideas from?

センラ#187

時間をありがとう、トニー。今日の話の多くは、他のどこでも聞いたことがない。表面を少し引っかいただけだと思う。数ヶ月ごとでも、1年ごとでも、いつでもまた来てほしい。

EN

Yeah. Well, I mean I mean you're right, Toby is absolutely great. Um and um well well first of all uh some of the peers I have are just people that I grew up with, right? Like if you think like one of the benefit which we didn't get into was one of the benefits of you know Y Cominator besides just being a forcing function of whether or not of testing our commitment um you know to the project uh was actually the peer group but we actually never got into that part where you know if you think about like the 2010s right so the companies that grew out of Y cominator that we kind of grew alongside with maybe we were slightly in different batches or you know not exactly in the same but whether it was the Airbnbs Stripe, Coinbase, we all kind of grew up in the same era, if you will. And so, as a result, got to know each other um through, you know, different events and venues and things like this. But trading notes, you know, uh with one another, I I think certainly was and and we've all had our shares of, you know, challenges and and and triumphs. Um and then looking at companies that are ahead of us, right? um you know in my not day job in my other job I play a small role in Meta's part where I serve on the board um learning from you know founders like Mark um who certainly have built companies that are at a different level of scale um versus where Door Dash is at. Well I think the first thing that impresses me a lot about Mark is this willingness to always learn new things. I I think one of the the the the traps, if you will, of success or fighting your own psychology um is actually not just the challenging parts about that when things aren't going well, but it's also when after things go well and maybe you actually have achieved some milestone. Um and one of the trappings of success is actually wanting to hold on to it. And what you see in someone like Mark and the team I would argue at Meta is this willingness to reinvent themselves um betting early for example on um building a different platform in the case of you know virtual reality augmented reality um obviously they're going all in on AI um and those things take a ton of courage there's not a lot of data you know early on in a either a platform shift or a new technology is arrival to know whether or not you're on the right track all the time. But you got to place the bets um you know before you can see the success. And I think that that willingness to learn a new domain where you're the rookie, where you're going to stumble, where you're going to get criticized, misunderstood, you don't know the answer. um which is the opposite, if you will, of the successes maybe that they came from in terms of the previous businesses they've created. That is really impressive. That willingness to always be the beginner, to always go in the arena and and and and and sweat and bleed and toil and and and struggle. Um that's really impressive. You both share a love of jiu-jitsu. Have you found anything from your jiu-jitsu practice that uh like you brought back to your day job? And it's almost like an exercise where there's so many um opposites that you have to hold at the same time. The best jiu-jitsu athletes can both be extremely firm and strong yet at the same time extremely relaxed. Um, they're very capable of being intentional with their game plan, but then give up and release their agenda within a nancond if they see that they're losing their position. I think the willingness uh of how to be so flexible um is certainly something that I I I think I'm trying to teach both myself in my personal life and also um bringing that back at to Door Dash. I think the other thing is just, you know, no different I think from frankly any craft, the the willingness to just get 1% better every day. Um, in a particular position, any particular flexibility exercise to actually just improve your balance in order to hold a position. very small things um ultimately compound when you look at the elite athletes, the not someone like myself, but the elite jiu-jitsu practitioners um who win the world championships or who win medals at events um they all have that and when you actually talk to them about their craft, it's the tiny details. It's the edges of a move. It's actually not some, you know, silver bullet that they're looking for in a match or something like that. In fact, actually, these matches at the most competitive levels are decided by sometimes not even points. They're decided by like what are called advantages and that is, you know, one thing that I think is just a great reminder that you always have to be trying to master that craft. Yes. Yeah. Well, um it changes by the month. So, I I uh this is a this is a question that if we were to talk, you know, in the future, I'm I'm not sure it' be actually the same answer. Um well, one of the first things I would say is, you know, I think about some of the systems that we've architected here about how you can learn from doing things that don't scale all the way to um shipping, especially with something like coding. Right now, I I think where the agents are, they're they're still good at what I call, you know, functional tasks. Um for example, coding. Um but outside of coding and looking at cross functional areas, they're not quite there yet for for a lot of reasons. But um but within something like coding, the things that you could do today um where uh anyone actually, frankly, it doesn't have to be anyone of any function. anyone can come up with an idea, run the prototype, run the experimentation and the analysis and then actually ship to a small group of people all by themselves. Um that is very impressive and and that collapses if you will um you know the the amount of activity required or speeds up the the learning loop you can have in any scientific process inside your company that touches code. That's very cool. Um second, um LLMs, you know, what are they good at that humans are not good at or less good at? Well, they can have almost infinite memory and infinite context and search across any sort of file. Um okay, so then the question becomes how do you actually feed it the right information? And if you can feed it the right information, it probably can do a lot better than humans can at the same activity. So I think those are two areas in which whether it's speeding up your learning processes or actually improving um the same activities right now that are effectively manually done um to be done with higher not just efficiency but also effectiveness. Think about like what a wild ride you're on like you start the company and your competitors are literally using fax machines to now we're in like the age of AI. Yeah. And I I love this quote and we'll end here. Um but you have this great quote where it's like there's just no way better way to be an expert than to just do the work. You might be surprised at how quickly you get to become the expert. Sure. That was fun. Thanks for making time. Thanks, David. I hope you enjoyed this episode. Please remember to subscribe wherever you're listening and leave a review. And make sure you listen to my other podcast, Founders. For almost a decade, I've obsessively read over 400 biographies of history's greatest entrepreneurs, searching for ideas that you can use in your work. Most of the guests you hear on this show first found me through founders.

シュー#188

もちろん。楽しかった。時間を作ってくれてありがとう、デイビッド。

EN

Let's stay on Mark for a second because um we were talking before we recorded. I got to spend uh some time with him. I had a few conversations with him and came across like even more impressed than I thought I would be given the fact that for his age he doesn't really have a peer and I actually told him that. So I was like I wish you did more podcasts and talked about how you built a company that no one else your age is even remotely close to. But like what are some things that you like you're on the board what are some things like you've learned from observing him? Well, jiu-jitsu is a is a fascinating um activity. I mean, it it is it's like some version of physical chess. It's a great way to think about it. I have to ask you about how AI is changing the way that you guys are running a business. You have this great line. said, I think some of the technical advances like AI have given people new ways to run companies. How are you using it? What are you doing? How's it affecting your work? Would there be any benefit for you like partnering with one of the big model companies with all the the physical data that you're guys collecting or you would keep that proprietary? most of the information to run you know Door Dash to be a great service um you know are things that we use for ourselves and the reason why we use them for ourselves is because I it it's not just that simple like oh we just give away information and then somehow someone's going to be able to do something positive with it. You also have to take the action that the data kind of suggests. For example, if the data says something is missing in this order um or the dasher is at the wrong location um and cannot find the customer. Let's say that those are all parts of you know pieces of information. some corresponding action has to take place in order to actually solve the endto-end job in order to get the item that was missing or in order to actually find the customer um you know where the dasher is and and so a lot of Door Dash is sure we have a lot of information but we have to do something productive because it's the endto-end job that ultimately you know we get judged on um with customers and so I if we can um partner with anyone frankly in order to solve the endto-end problem better of course we would do that but I think it's very hard sometimes to just give away something um if there is no ability to you know correspond that with action that ultimately will solve some customer's problem. You have this great in 13 years. Yeah, that's beautiful. Thank you very much for the time, Tony. Uh I think we just like scratched surface. I think there's a lot of things that you said today that I haven't heard anywhere else. I'd love if you just come back on every, you know, a few months, every year, whenever you want.

FAQ

なぜ英語が「自動字幕ベース」なの? 公式の文字起こしは?

このページの英語は、YouTube が生成した automatic captions(ASR=音声認識) を yt-dlp で取得したものです。人手で整えた公式トランスクリプトではありません。

- 動画: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a8LWEMD9VJA - 公式: https://www.davidsenra.com

公式サイトにはエピソード要約・ショーノートはありますが、取得時点では全文の公式文字起こしは前提にしていません。

自動字幕の精度は? どこが壊れやすい?

インタビュー2人で比較的クリアですが、固有名詞・社名・金額・地名・早口で崩れます。

| 字幕に出やすい崩れ | おそらく正しい表記 | |---|---| | Paulo Alto / Paltodely / powaltodely | Palo Alto Delivery(DoorDash 前身) | | Door Dash / Ford Door Dash | DoorDash | | internet square | Square(決済、カードリーダー) | | Y Cominator | Y Combinator | | Mickey from Vault / Wolt | Miki Kuusi / Wolt(欧州デリバリー、DoorDash が買収) | | dashers | Dashers(DoorDash の配達パートナー) | | Find My Friends | Find My Friends(Apple の位置共有) | | Christopher Payne | Christopher Payne(初期 COO として言及) | | Kroger / CVS | Kroger / CVS | | Dashar fulfillment | Dasher Fulfillment Solutions | | Whimo | Waymo | | Door Dash Dot | DoorDash Dot(自律配送ロボット) | | Toby Luke | Tobi Lütke(Shopify) | | Robbie Gupta | 相互の友人として言及(表記は字幕依存) | | 0ero to1 | Zero to One(Thiel) | | Apploven / axon | AppLovin / Axon(スポンサー) | | Deal / deel.com | Deel / deel.com(スポンサー) | | RAMP / ramp.com | Ramp(スポンサー) |

日本語本文では多くを修正済み。英語欄は「音声の生ログ」に近く、引用の一次ソースは動画を優先してください。

日本語と英語は1対1で完全対応している?

していません。 日本語は読みやすさのためまとめ・整文。英語は字幕切れ目が細かい(話者交代の >> も完全ではない)。話者(センラ/シュー)を手がかりに、話題の塊として読むのが正しい使い方です。スポンサー読み上げ(Ramp、Deel、AppLovin/Axon)は日本語から省略しています。

上部トグルは何のため?

- 英語原文 ON/OFF … まず日本語だけ読みたい人向け(英語は約9.5px) - 英語を少し大きく … 対照精読用(約11px)

デフォルトは「日本語メイン・英語は極小」。

Tony Xu / DoorDash / シュー とは?

Tony Xu(トニー・シュー) は DoorDash の共同創業者・CEO。中国からの移民として育ち、スタンフォード在学中の2013年頃に共同創業者と Palo Alto Delivery を始め、のち DoorDash に。本編では MVP・郊外仮説・1000日の資金調達地獄・実験文化・採用・自律配送などを語る。

DoorDash はフードデリバリーから始まった物流・ローカルコマースのプラットフォーム。ダッシャー(配達パートナー)、加盟店、消費者の三者を結ぶ。本編時点の話では40カ国超の事業、Dasher Fulfillment、自律車両(DoorDash Dot)、加盟店向けデータ/実験支援など「街のすべてを届ける」「地元経済を育てる」方向が語られる。数字・範囲は話者の口頭ベースで、公式IRと完全一致する保証はありません。

日本語話者ラベルは meta に合わせ シュー(Xu)。

David Senra(センラ)とは?

起業家伝記を扱う Founders ポッドキャストで知られるホスト。本番組 David Senra Show では創業者インタビューを行う。本編では Bezos・Walton・Wright 兄弟など史実・伝記との対比を多用する。

Palo Alto Delivery.com / 43分の MVP とは?

DoorDash 前身の最小実験。ドメインは約 9ドル。静的ページにパロアルト近辺 8枚の PDF メニュー、注文は Google Voice が創業者4人の携帯に鳴る。創業者が注文を取り、店に発注し、取りに行き、届ける。決済は初期の Square ドングル。ディスパッチは Find My Friends。自分たちの銀行口座で回し、マーケ費ほぼなし、と語られる。

なぜパロアルト(郊外)から始めた?

学生としてそこにいたのが出発点。実験としてパロアルト vs サンフランシスコ配達を比較し、密度の低いパロアルトの方が完了が速い場面があった、と。駐車・一戸建て・ハブ&スポーク(メインストリートと居住地)が効率に効く。顧客は若い子どものいる家族が多く、徒歩では店が遠い。競合が都市中心の「オーダー密度」に行く中、オーガニック需要と物流数学が合う場所として郊外型を重視した、という説明。

YC の夏に答えた「3つの問い」は?

1. 消費者は(当時)約 6ドル の手数料を払うか 2. レストランは約 15% で提携するか 3. ダッシャーに払える賃金が成立するか

Demo Day や調達額より、この3問への確信が継続の条件だった、と語られる。

スタンフォードのフットボール試合・クッキー返金とは?

稼働約 3ヶ月目(2013年9月) の土曜。試合後の需要急増で全配達が大幅遅延し、サイトを止められなかった。顧客は返金を求めていなかったが、全員返金を決断。当時キャッシュはあと2〜3週間分程度で、返金はその約 40%、と口頭。その夜クッキーを焼き、朝5時頃に届けた。「凡庸で生きるより、基準に従って死にかける」判断として語られる。

「見えないデータが殺す」/95%失敗の実験とは?

消費者アプリに見えるランチ・ディナーの裏に、ダッシャー体験・オペ・加盟店摩擦・在庫精度など複製しにくい要素がある、という話。配達は約20ステップに分解でき、物理世界は常に変化し構造化データが足りない。何万の実験の多くは顧客に届く前に失敗し、効いた約5%が複利になる、と語られる。実験量・割合は口頭の比喩・概算を含む。

Wolt / ミッキーの逸話は?

センラがストックホルムで Daniel Ek 主催の夕食にいたとき、隣が Wolt 側の創業者(字幕では Mickey/Vault 等と崩れやすい)で、「ヨーロッパの DoorDash」として戦っていたが、追加大型調達のタームシートを前に「彼には勝てない」と口が動き、売却して Tony の下で学ぶ選択をした、という第三者伝聞。本編ではヨーロッパ事業を彼が回している、と Tony が肯定。買収・役職の詳細は公式発表を優先。

「1000日の地獄」とは?

原題のテーマ。内部指標は改善方向なのに、調達・ナラティブ・キャッシュが苦しかった約3年(2016年春前後を起点に語られる)。初の休暇(妻とハワイ約5日)中/直後に公場急落→プライベート調達凍結、Series C 周りの投資家の後退、Uber/Amazon などの競合ナラティブ、「永遠赤字」論などが重なった、と。No は 50回で数えるのをやめ、100超、と口頭。対処は(1)コントロールできることへの集中(成長×利益×キャッシュの and)、(2)仕事上の本物の友人、(3)運動ルーティンと妻とのデートナイト、と語られる。

Rhodes Scholar × Navy SEAL 採用とは?

頭の処理能力(非構造データの分析)と、動いて情報を取る行動力の両方、という省略表現。最終面接の例: 20分質問→20ドルで8時間以内に100顧客獲得(やめて帰る選択も可)。エンジニアはホンダ内で一緒に配達。履歴書よりバイアス・フォー・アクション、ディテール、対立概念の同時保持、フォロワーシップなどを見た、と。Christopher Payne(初代COOとして言及)の「頼んでいない配達+長文メール」逸話、CFO候補の巨大財務モデル持参なども本編に出る。

ダッシャー vs Uber X 実験とは?

創業直後。双方約20人に、時給約20ドル環境でスイッチなら 25ドル保証を提示。40人中ほぼ動かず(1人程度)。結論として配達とライドシェアは別人格・別ニーズの集団。ダッシャーは若め・女性比率高め・多様な車両/副業的時間、Uber X 側は当時より男性・四輪・フルタイム寄り、など口頭の観察。今日も重なりは少ない、と。

Dasher Fulfillment / DoorDash Dot / Waymo とは?

- Dasher Fulfillment Solutions: 本編では前年秋(9月)発表として、Kroger や CVS 等の商品を DoorDash 側倉庫からも届けられる在庫・物流の話。 - DoorDash Dot: ラストマイル向け自律ロボット。道路・歩道・自転車レーン。ロボタクシーとはフォームが違う「最後の10フィート」用。開発は2019年開始、約6〜7年、アリゾナ(Phoenix/Scottsdale)で稼働、と口頭。 - Waymo: 提携あり。ドア閉め等のエッジケースは例として言及(詳細は断定せず)。

永遠のミッション/二つのマネジメントシステムとは?

ミッション: 地元経済を育て、力を与える(grow and empower local economies)。代替は巨大1〜2プレイヤーの世界、近所の人格の喪失、と。

オペ: PMF後は(1)コアの旅客機を飛ばしながら空中エンジン交換するような改善、(2)紙飛行機=再びPMFを探す新規、の2システム。目標・インセンティブを分け、社内はステージゲート型の「社内ベンチャー」に近い配分、と語られる。

AI の使い方は?

月ごとに変わる、と前置き。コーディング等の機能タスクでは、アイデア→試作→実験→小出荷のループが一人で回せる方向。LLMは記憶・横断検索に強いが、正しい情報を食わせることが鍵。物理データは「渡すだけ」では足りず、欠品や迷子ダッシャーに対応する行動がエンドツーエンド評価に必要、と。大手モデル会社との連携は、エンドツーエンドが良くなるなら、という条件付き。

本編の主な数字(口頭・概算)

| 内容 | 口頭の数字 | |---|---| | 米国レストラン数(創業時イメージ) | 約100万、配達あり2万〜2.5万 | | MVP ドメイン | 約9ドル | | 初期オーダー | 1日約10、ピーク約21 | | 消費者手数料 / レストラン | 約6ドル / 約15% | | フットボール夜の返金 | 口座の約40%、残りキャッシュ2〜3週分 | | 配達の分解 | 約20ステップ | | 投資家の No | 50で打ち切り、100超 | | 初休暇 | 創業約3年後、5日 | | ダッシャー労働時間 | 平均週3〜4時間、90%が週10時間未満 | | Dot 開発 | 2019〜約6–7年 | | 事業国 | 40カ国超 |

正確な契約・会計・KPI は一次資料を確認してください。

スポンサーは?

本文では Ramp / Deel / AppLovin(Axon) などのスポンサー読み上げを省略しています。本編の創業史・実験・採用・1000日・ミッションの議論には含めていません。